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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF SCHOOL FINANCE POLICIES
BY
JINSUB CHOI
August 2017
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace
Major Department: Economics

This dissertation consists of three chapters empirically analyzing how households and
state-local governments respond to economic incentives created by school finance policies.
The first chapter analyzes what effect school capital investments have on housing values
and household location choice. If the benefit of school capital investments outweighs the
potential increase in local taxes, it would create an incentive for households to move into
communities with school capital investments so that school capital investments may increase
housing values in the context of the Tiebout model. My research identifies an exogenous
variation in school capital investments by exploiting the lottery allocation of entitlement to an
interest-free construction bond among districts in California. Although the lottery is exogenous,
additional non-lottery allocation complicates identification. I develop an empirical model based
on a sample selection method to create a counterfactual state in which additional non-lottery
allocation would not have existed. I find that receiving the interest-free construction bond
increases school capital expenditure and housing values at the district level. I find little evidence
for the effect of the bond on household sorting and student’s academic outcomes.

The second chapter studies the centralization of school finance in Michigan and its
consequence for school revenue and spending. In an attempt to reduce spending disparities
between rich and poor school districts, the Michigan state government centralized a school
finance system by restricting local discretion on raising school revenue and increasing grants to
district governments. Previous theoretical studies suggest that the centralization could reduce the
level of school spending, but the empirical evidence is limited in the literature. Using the districtlevel panel data on school finance in Michigan and 4 neighboring states for the period of fiscal
year 1990-2004, I estimate the effect of the centralization on the level of school revenue and
spending and find that the centralization significantly levels down school revenue and spending.
The third chapter investigates how households value the school finance reform’s fiscal
package in the case of the Michigan reform by estimating the effect on housing values, based on
the Tiebout model in which fiscal attractiveness is capitalized into housing values. Although the
previous studies have examined how U.S. states school finance reforms affect school resources
and educational outcomes, there exists little literature on whether they are fiscally attractive to
households beyond the effect on them. My research fills this gap in the literature. I find that the
reform increases median housing values in Michigan, having a greater positive effect on housing
values in wealthier communities. It implies that the reform benefits Michigan households on
average but benefits wealthier households more.
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Introduction

In the United States, education is the largest expenditure category for state and local
governments, followed by health care and public safety programs. In fiscal year 2012, 31.9 % of
state and local direct general expenditures went toward education, and over two-third of it were
devoted to elementary and secondary education1. However, the level of school spending is not
very equal across school districts. For example, in fiscal year 2012, school spending in New
York City’s school district, the largest school district in the United States in terms of the number
of students, is $20,226 per pupil, whereas school spending in the largest school district in Utah is
below $6,200 per pupil2.
The level of school spending for families largely depends on which community they
reside in, that also determines the amount of local school taxes that families should pay. Due to
this characteristic, public school finance can be understood in the framework of the Tiebout
model which suggests that households maximize their utility by sorting across communities to
shop for better fiscal packages. It implies that families may change their location choices in
response to incentives created by school finance policies, also having other implications for
housing market and intergovernmental relations. My dissertation is the empirical study for these
issues.
In Chapter I, I estimate the effect of school capital investments on housing values and
household location choices. Better school infrastructure may improve student’s health, safety,

1

Statistics come from the Urban Institute:
http://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-local-finance-initiative/projects/state-and-localbackgrounders/state-and-local-expenditures
2
Statistics come from an article in the Washington Post:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/05/23/the-dramatic-inequality-of-public-school-spending-inamerica/?utm_term=.c826fe4b6e60

1

academic learning, and children’s satisfaction (e.g., aesthetic appeal of good facilities). If the
value of better school infrastructure is greater than the increase in local school taxes, households
may have an incentive to move into communities with school capital investments. With this
household’s potential mobility across communities, the value of better school infrastructure
should be capitalized into housing values. Based on the Tiebout model, the aforementioned
effects on housing values and household sorting are likely to exist, but empirical evidence is
limited. I contribute to the literature by suggesting convincing evidence.
In Chapter II, I explore the relationship between school finance system and the level of
school resources. School spending inequalities may be solved by centralizing school finance at
the state level and distribute a large and equal grant to each school district. However, there may
be a consequence of the centralization for the level of school resources. In the spirit of the
Tiebout model, previous theoretical studies suggest the potential trade-off between spending
equalities and the level of spending. I suggest evidence for this trade-off through my empirical
analysis.
In Chapter III, I answer the question of whether a school finance reform, that aims to
equalize school spending, is fiscally beneficial to households. I especially focus on the Michigan
school finance reform that dramatically changed the mix of school resources and taxes, having
an ambiguous effect on household’s utility. I evaluate it by estimating the effect of the reform on
housing values, based on the Tiebout model that implies the capitalization of local fiscal
attractiveness. We may infer whether the school finance reform is fiscally beneficial to
households from the estimated effect on housing values.

2

Chapter I: The Effect of School Capital Investments on Local Housing Markets and
Household Sorting: Evidence from the Interest-Free Construction Bond in California

Introduction
The quality of school infrastructure can have an effect on the various outcomes of
children in school. For example, attractive school campus would give children aesthetic pleasure,
and modern ventilation system would be helpful for children’s healthy school life. Thus, it is
obvious for parents to prefer to send their children to schools with better infrastructure. It leads
to my hypothesis that the fiscal attractiveness of better school infrastructure affects parents’
location choice and housing values.
Despite the potential impact of school capital investments on local housing markets and
household sorting, this topic has not been thoroughly investigated in the literature. In order to
suggest new evidence for it, this essay estimates the treatment effect of winning entitlement to
the interest-free construction bond that was allocated by lottery drawing among districts in
California. This interest-free construction bond is called the Qualified School Construction Bond
(QSCB) 3. I consider that winning the QSCB lottery would encourage school districts to invest in
school facilities which would not have happened otherwise. Thus, my treatment effect of
winning the QSCB lottery can reveal what effect better school facilities would have on housing
market and household sorting. To the best of my knowledge, this essay is the first research
investigating the effect of the lottery allocation of QSCBs on economic outcomes.

3

The Qualified School Construction Bond (QSCB) was created by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 and nationally provided to school districts through state education agencies in 2009 and 2010. Under the
program, selective districts could issue interest-free bonds for the construction and renovation of school facilities
and the purchase of land.
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In 2009, the California Department of Education received applications for entitlement to
the QSCB from school districts and drew lotteries. As a result, 43 lucky districts received
QSCBs out of 226 applicants (districts). Since the QSCB allocation was random among
applicants, it can provide a good identification strategy to investigate the effect of school capital
investments. However, the existence of an additional non-lottery allocation following the initial
lottery allocation makes identification complicated; to be specific, winning the QSCB lottery
could discourage districts to apply for the additional non-lottery allocation of QSCBs since many
of these districts did not need additional QSCBs. Thus, lottery winners (districts) could be less
likely to receive additional non-lottery QSCBs, making my estimates for the effect of winning
the bond lottery confounded by the additional non-lottery allocation.
To estimate the correct causal effect in a counterfactual state in which the additional nonlottery allocation would not have existed, this essay develops an empirical model that is able to
control for additional non-lottery allocation. This model involves double sample selection and a
correction procedure based on the existing literature. Under this correction procedure, it is
practically difficult to use the 2SLS method that uses the QSCB lottery as an instrumental
variable for school capital investments. Thus, this essay estimates the reduced form regression
equation.
In respect of theoretical framework, this essay’s topic is closely related to the Tiebout
model (Tiebout, 1956; Hamilton, 1975). One of the Tiebout model’s implication for the
allocation of QSCBs is that it would induce households to sort across communities by their
preference for the mixture of local school infrastructure and taxes; for example, households with
school-age children might be more likely to move into QSCB-awarded districts than households
without children. Households without children may move out of QSCB-awarded districts due to

4

a potential increase in local taxes. Another implication of the Tiebout model is the capitalization
of school capital investment into housing values; that is, if the present value of the benefit of
better school infrastructure is greater than the present value of the cost of an increase in local
taxes, housing values should increase as the difference of the fiscal attractiveness is capitalized
into housing values.
In my empirical work, I first investigate what effect QSCBs have on housing values at the
district level with the expectation that winning the QSCB lottery would increase housing values.
I would view the increase in housing values as the capitalization of better school infrastructure.
In addition, I estimate whether the QSCB allocation induces households with children (under 18)
to move into QSCB-awarded districts but induce households without children to move out of.
The existence of this relocation effect would be evidence for underling Tiebout sorting.
There is the vast volume of empirical literature linking school quality to household
sorting and housing values4. However, the existing literature focuses on current expenditure, test
scores, and school choice restrictions as measures of school quality, leaving the role of school
facilities relatively unknown. This may be because school capital expenditure is endogenous to
unobserved local factors, resulting in a difficulty in empirical identification.
Recently, a few studies suggest convincing evidence for the effect of school capital
investments. Cellini et al. (2010) develop a dynamic regression discontinuity design that
compares outcomes between a group of districts that narrowly passed bond referenda and a
group of districts that narrowly failed the referenda after controlling for the dynamic effect of
bond referenda passage. They find that referenda passage largely increases school capital

4

For example, for the effect of student performance on housing prices, see Ries and Somerville (2010) and Black
(1999). For the relationship between school finance equalization and Tiebout sorting, see Chakrabarti and Roy
(2015), Hilber and Mayer (2004), and Aaronson (1999). For the effect of the school choice program on housing
values, see Reback (2005).
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expenditure and consequently lead to an increase in local housing prices by about 6% in
California.
Neilson and Zimmerman (2014) choose a different research design to estimate the effect
of school capital investments on test scores and home prices. Using a difference-in-differences
framework, they compare schools that had construction projects with schools that did not have
them in New Haven, Connecticut. Their results suggest that school construction increases home
prices in affected neighborhood by about 10% and raises reading scores by 0.15 standard
deviations.
Although this present essay is closely related to those studies, it greatly differs in
empirical strategy. A key contribution of this essay is that it proposes additional evidence for the
effect of school capital investments on housing values by using an independent identification
strategy5. I find that QSCB lottery increases school capital expenditure, while it hardly affects
school current expenditure. The effect on school capital expenditure peaks in the third year of the
QSCB allocation and drops after that. My results also show that winning the lottery increases
median housing values at the district level. The estimated effects on household sorting outcomes
have desired signs, but they are small and not significant. I also estimate the effect of the lottery
on student’s academic outcomes, but I find little effect.
In the following sections, I explain the QSCB program, empirical strategy, data, results,
and then conclude this essay.

5

Although previous studies on this topic suggested convincing evidence, their empirical designs are not perfect.
This makes this present essay’s evidence worthwhile. One limitation of Cellini et al. (2010)’s dynamic discontinuity
regression design is that it requires to condition on referendum outcomes and a dummy for bond measures which
might be endogenous to local unobserved factors. One limitation of Neilson and Zimmerman (2014) is that they
only look at schools in one district, so that their estimates might be easily susceptible to spillovers from neighboring
areas within a district.
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Allocation of the QSCB in California
The QSCB program was a U.S. federal program created by the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009. Under the program, selected school districts could issue interest-free
bonds for the construction and renovation of school facilities and the purchase of land as the
federal income tax credit in lieu of district’s interest payments would be given to QSCB lenders
(financial institutions). QSCBs of $11 billion were nationally provided in 2009 and 2010
respectively, and the U.S. Department of Treasury allocated QSCBs to state’s education
agencies. Each state’s education agency had discretion on how to allocate entitlement to the
QSCB to its school districts.
California education agencies received QSCBs of about $800 million for allocation to its
districts in 2009 and about $700 million in 2010. Except a few charter schools, the California
Department of Education (CDE) had authority to allocate QSCBs to 962 school districts6. The
CDE held two rounds to allocate QSCBs. In the first round (2009), the CDE received
applications from districts and then drew lotteries out of applications until exhausting all of
state’s QSCB allocation in the presence of the audience on August 28th, 2009. As a result,
QSCBs were given to 43 districts out of 226 applicants; each district receives QSCBs of $16
million on average7. I consider this first round allocation as random and want to use it to identity
the empirical model. Districts which received first round QSCBs were required to issue them by

6

The number of school districts is the result of my calculation based on enrollment data from the California
Department of Education. I exclude the county offices of education, other special schools from the number of school
districts for the purpose of this study.
7
In the first round, each district can apply for QSCBs of a certain amount with the maximum of $25 million.
Districts which won the lottery get the whole requested amount, and the state government did not cut the amount.
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July, 20108; otherwise, the remaining QSCBs were recaptured and rolled over to the second
round allocation.
In the second round (2011~2012), the CDE received new applications (lottery-awarded
districts could also apply if they had issued all allocated QSCBs) and ranked them by the
following criteria: 1) the date of postmark, 2) projects with approval from the Division of the
State Architect, and 3) the percentage of students who qualified for the federal free and reducedprice meals program in fiscal year 2009. In evaluating the second round applicants, districts were
not penalized for winning the first round QSCB lottery. 132 districts applied for the second
round assignment. 46 districts out of first round applicants and 32 districts out of first round nonapplicants received QSCBs in the second round. Among districts winning the first QSCB lottery,
only 3 districts applied for the second round, and 1 lottery-won district received QSCBs in the
second round. QSCBs which were not issued within 180 days of the date of the second round
allocation were rolled over so that the allocations were not complete until early 2012.
One test for the validity of the QSCB lottery is to check whether socioeconomic variables
are balanced between a group of districts winning the first round QSCB lottery and a group of
districts losing the lottery. Table 1 presents a test for the difference in means of each
predetermined variable by winning/losing status. Data mostly comes from the American
Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates in 2009. Column (1)-(2) show means and standard
deviations of each variable by groups. Column (3) shows the difference in means and its standard
error. Although the mean of each variable is not perfectly balanced between groups, the

8

The CDE required that the first round QSCBs must be issued by July, 2010. According to federal regulations, at
least 10% of QSCB proceeds must be spent within 6 months of the issuance of QSCBs, and 100% must be spent
within 3 years.
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Table 1: Mean of Pre-Treatment Variables by QSCB Lottery Status

Variables
Median owner-occupied housing value
($) 2005-2009
# households with own children
2005-2009
Avg. school capital expenditure
per pupil ($) 2005-2009
Avg. school current expenditure per
pupil ($) 2005-2009
Median household income ($)
2005-2009
Unemployment rate (%) 2005-2009
Median income of families with children
($) 2005-2009
% 4-year college graduates 2005-2009
% high school graduates 2005-2009
# avg. enrolled students 2005-2009
Median number of rooms for
owner-occupied housing 2005-2009
Housing vacancy rate (%)
2005-2009
% blacks 2005-2009
% Asians 2005-2009
Median age 2005-2009
% child population 2005-2009
% aged population 2005-2009

Observations

Mean of variables
Districts winning
Districts losing
the lottery
the lottery
(1)
(2)
501,108.883
[218,381.038]
10,173.275
[9,245.710]
1,752.253
[2,437.123]
5,913.835
[692.818]
68,935.572
[22671.534]
8.713
[2.792]
72,928.295
[30,323.281]
15.214
[7.833]
24.486
[5.633]
12,296.100
[11,084.316]
5.912
[0.505]
8.169
[5.012]
3.085
[4.206]
8.365
[7.455]
35.285
[4.444]
27.163
[3.839]
11.480
[3.041]

490,092.763
[223,749.418]
9,721.983
[11,218.036]
1,598.735
[1,680.168]
6,068.107
[1,358.682]
67,329.181
[20542.106]
8.488
[3.357]
74,073.908
[29,109.189]
15.972
[8.490]
23.533
[5.497]
10,233.402
[11,171.784]
5.879
[0.512]
9.418
[9.948]
4.017
[4.312]
11.193
[13.191]
35.287
[6.588]
26.926
[5.817]
11.101
[4.621]

40

174

Diff. in
means
(3)
11,016.120
(39,062.672)
451.292
(1,908.155)
153.518
(323.151)
-133.764
(191.432)
1,606.391
(3673.569)
0.224
(0.572)
-1,145.612
(5,144.080)
-0.759
(1.468)
0.952
(0.968)
2,062.698
(1,956.144)
0.034
[0.090]
-1.250
(1.620)
-0. .932
(0.753)
-2.828
(2.163)
-0.002
(1.096)
0.236
(0.966)
0.379
(0.767)

Standard deviations are in brackets, and standard errors are in parentheses. The sample consists of school districts
that applied for the first round of QSCB allocation. I lose 12 observations due to missing data. Asterisks may
indicate significance levels for the difference in means, but none of them are statistically significant in the table.

9

difference in means is minimal when considering the small sample. I find no variable with the
statistical difference in means.

Empirical Strategy
Basic model.
In this essay, I want to estimate the treatment effect of winning the QSCB lottery on
outcome variables in a counterfactual state in which the second round allocation has not existed;
that is, I purse the causal effect of the QSCB lottery, while withholding the unintended event
(second round allocation) which is correlated with the first lottery allocation and also affects
outcome variables. The existence of second round allocation is a serious obstacle to obtaining the
correct treatment effect since the first round allocation can have an unintended effect on outcome
variables through the second round allocation; winning the QSCB lottery can discourage school
districts to apply for the second round allocation since many of lottery-won districts may not
need additional QSCBs9. Consequently, winning the lottery can make districts less likely to
receive second QSCBs, creating an unintended effect of the lottery through the second round
allocation. Since the difference in means of an outcome by lottery status is confounded by such
an unintended effect, it cannot be a correct estimator. Thus,
𝛾 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑖0 )

(1)

≠ 𝐸(𝑌𝑖 |𝑄𝑠𝑐𝑏1𝑖 = 1, 𝑃𝑡1𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖 |𝑄𝑠𝑐𝑏1𝑖 = 0, 𝑃𝑡1𝑖 = 1)
In (1), 𝑖 indexes school districts. 𝑌𝑖1 is a potential outcome of winning the QSCB lottery when
unintended responses do not occur, and 𝑌𝑖0 be a corresponding potential outcome of losing the

9

Data indeed shows that only 3 districts out of 40 lottery-won districts applied for the second round, whereas 71
districts out of 174 lottery-lost districts applied for the second round.
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QSCB lottery. 𝑌𝑖 is an observed outcome, 𝑄𝑠𝑐𝑏1𝑖 is a dummy for winning the QSCB lottery, and
𝑃𝑡1𝑖 is a dummy for participation in the first round of QSCB allocation. (1) says that the
difference in means of an outcome variable by lottery status is not the estimator for the treatment
effect that I pursue. The goal of my empirical model is to obtain the treatment effect after taking
the unintended effect through the second allocation and sample selection into account, so that we
would obtain estimates for a treatment effect close to 𝛾.
In controlling for the unintended effect through the second round allocation, I consider
the following OLS regression (as it is, it would not be consistently estimated).
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛾𝑄𝑠𝑐𝑏1𝑖 + 𝛼𝑃𝑡2𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖′ 𝛽 + 𝜐𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑡1𝑖 = 1

(2)

𝑃𝑡2𝑖 is a dummy for participation in the second round allocation which is included in order to
create a counterfactual state in which the second round allocation has not existed by capturing
the effect of the QSCB lottery on 𝑌𝑖 through the second round allocation. 𝑋𝑖 is controlled
variables. 𝑌𝑖 is trends in a housing market and household sorting outcome (e.g. a percent change
in median housing values and a percent change in the number of households with children). 𝛾 is
the treatment effect of winning the QSCB lottery10.
In estimating equation (2), two issues are raised. First, 𝑃𝑡2𝑖 is potentially endogenous to
unobserved local confounders. For example, the decision on participation in the second round is
likely to be affected by housing market and household sorting trends and the unobservables such
as the current stock of school capital. Second, the model’s sample is self-selected as the sample

10

Treatment is defined here as winning the QSCB lottery. If treatment was alternatively defined as the actual issue
of QSCBs, 𝛾 would be an estimate for the intention-to-treat effect. QSCB-awarded districts could refuse to issue
QSCBs due to the failure of the bond referenda passage or other uncertain reasons. Data shows that 31 districts out
of 43 lottery-won districts issued QSCBs.
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only includes participants (districts) in the first round. First round participants and nonparticipants are likely to be different in community traits from each other in many ways, so that
the treatment effect would not be very compelling if the effect is estimated only among first
round participants. Thus, I pursue the estimation of the treatment effect in the full sample
(including all districts) by using the self-selected sample consisting of first round participants. It
means that I need to correct sample selection bias when estimating equation (2). In the following
section, I set up a model to overcome those two problems and then consistently estimate equation
(2).

Double sample selection approach.
In this approach, I want to restrict the sample to school districts which apply for the first
round allocation but do not apply for the second round. With the double sample selection, 𝑃𝑡2𝑖 is
suppressed in (2), so that we do not need to condition on this endogenous variable any more. The
model is expressed by the following system of equations.
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛾𝑄𝑠𝑐𝑏1𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖′ 𝛽 + 𝜐𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑡1𝑖 = 1 & 𝑃𝑡2𝑖 = 0

(3)

𝑃𝑡1𝑖∗ = 𝑋𝑖′ 𝛿1 + 𝑢1𝑖

(4)

~𝑃𝑡2∗𝑖 = 𝛼1 𝑄𝑠𝑐𝑏1𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝑃𝑡1𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖′ 𝛿2 + 𝑢2𝑖

(5)

In equation (3), the sample is selected into districts which apply for the first round but do not
apply for the second round (𝑃𝑡1𝑖 = 1 and 𝑃𝑡2𝑖 = 0). In participation equation (4) and (5), 𝑃𝑡1𝑖∗
and ~𝑃𝑡2∗𝑖 are unobservable latent variables for 𝑃𝑡1𝑖 and ~𝑃𝑡2𝑖 respectively in which ~𝑃𝑡2𝑖 is
defined as a dummy for non-participation in the second round. Since my sample is restricted into
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second round non-participants (that is, 𝑃𝑡2𝑖 = 0) rather than participants, I prefer to use the nonparticipation dummy in equation (5)11.
Participation equations (4) and (5) have the recursive structure, so that 𝑃𝑡1𝑖 is on the left
side of equation (4) (in the form of a latent variable) and on the right side of equation (5). The
coefficient on 𝑃𝑡1𝑖 may not have a clear interpretation in participation equation (5), but 𝑄𝑠𝑐𝑏1𝑖
becomes exogenous only if conditioning on 𝑃𝑡1𝑖 .
𝛼1 is the coefficient on 𝑄𝑠𝑐𝑏1𝑖 in participation equation (5). I expect the sign of 𝛼1 to be
positive as the QSCB lottery discouraged the participation in the second round. I allow the error
terms 𝑢1𝑖 and 𝑢2𝑖 to be correlated with each other, which indicates a correlation between 𝑃𝑡1𝑖
and 𝑢2 in equation (5). I assume that the vector of error terms (𝜐𝑖 , 𝑢1𝑖 , 𝑢2𝑖 )′ has a trivariate
normal distribution with mean zero and the variance-covariance matrix given by
𝜎𝜐2
Σ = (𝜌𝜐1
𝜌𝜐2

𝜌𝜐1
1
𝜌

𝜌𝜐2
𝜌 )
1

(6)

Under the assumption of the bivariate normal distribution of 𝑢1𝑖 and 𝑢2𝑖 , we can consistently
estimate participation equations (4) and (5) (regardless of the endogeneity of 𝑃𝑡1𝑖 ) by the full
maximum likelihood procedure of the bivariate probit model12.
Under the double sample selection, the estimated parameters of housing market and
household sorting equation (3) are not consistent unless both 𝜌𝜐1 and 𝜌𝜐2 are zero in Σ, which is
̂ 𝑖 and 𝜆2
̂𝑖 , to housing
not likely to hold. Therefore, I add sample selection correction terms, 𝜆1

11

It would lead to equivalent results regardless of which dummy is used between 𝑃𝑡2𝑖 and ~𝑃𝑡2𝑖 . Existing
literature derives the additive correction terms for the sample selection model in terms of participation. In order to
lead to equivalent results regardless of the use between 𝑃𝑡2𝑖 and ~𝑃𝑡2𝑖 , one needs to newly derive the additive
correction terms in terms of non-participation. The use of ~𝑃𝑡2𝑖 in lieu of 𝑃𝑡2𝑖 allow us to avoid such complication
with no harm.
12
See Greene (2012), Ch. 17.5.5 and Wooldridge (2010), Ch. 15.7.3.
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̂ 𝑖 and 𝜆2
̂𝑖 can be obtained by estimating
market and household sorting equation (3). 𝜆1
participation equation (4) and (5). As a result, the equation that I estimate in this essay is
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛾𝑄𝑠𝑐𝑏1𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖′ 𝛽 + 𝜎𝜐1 𝜆1𝑖 + 𝜎𝜐2 𝜆2𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑡1𝑖 = 1 & 𝑃𝑡2𝑖 = 0

(7)

This correction procedure with two additive terms (𝜆1𝑖 and 𝜆2𝑖 ) are suggested by Poirier (1980)
and Ham (1982) and can be understood as the extension of Heckman’s two-stage procedure
(Heckman, 1979). The Heckman correction model is generally not valid in the case of double
sample selection. The correction model that I use here works properly in the case of double
sample selection, the correlation between 𝑢1𝑖 and 𝑢2𝑖 (that is, 𝜌 ≠ 0), and sample selection on
the unobservables under the assumption that stated above. The formula for 𝜆1𝑖 and 𝜆2𝑖 are
presented in Appendix A.
𝛾 is the treatment effect of winning the QSCB lottery on 𝑌𝑖 . I expect that winning the
lottery would affect 𝑌𝑖 through an increase in school capital investments at the district level.
However, more school capital investments do not mean immediate better school facilities since
construction and renovation take time. Some of QSCB-funded construction projects might not be
even complete for the study period. Furthermore, it is difficult to isolate my treatment effect
from an effect through interest savings on QSCBs. Thus, my empirical model does not aim to
precisely estimate the size of the effect of better school facilities. Instead, I would draw
implication of better school facilities from the treatment effect of winning the lottery.
In estimating equation (7), standard errors are not consistent since additive correction
terms are just proxies for true 𝜆1𝑖 and 𝜆2𝑖 . To overcome this issue, I use asymptotically
consistent standard errors under double sample selection, which is suggested by Ham (1982). A
key procedure to derive the formula for this standard error is to approximate 𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆̂𝑖 by first-
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order Taylor series of 𝜆̂𝑖 with respect to parameters. The resulting standard errors is consistent
under sample selection and robust to heteroscedasticity. The formula is presented in Appendix B.

Data
I obtain data on QSCB allocations in California from the website of the California
Department of Education13. The data contains the list of districts that applied for the QSCB

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean
(1)

S.D.
(2)

Panel A: Outcome variables
%𝛥 median owner-occupied housing values
%𝛥# households with own children
%𝛥# households without own children
𝛥 housing vacancy rate (%)
Log school capital expenditure per pupil+1 2013
Inverse hyperbolic sine school capital expenditure per pupil 2013
Log school current expenditure for instruction 2013
Log CAASPP test score 2015
% students who meet a standard of CAASPP test 2015
% students who exceed a standard of CAASPP test 2015

-30.270
-1.221
7.572
0.333
5.807
6.445
8.628
7.824
23.651
14.097

14.163
18.744
14.302
0.359
2.257
2.389
0.177
0.020
6.065
10.328

Panel B. QSCB variables
Dummy for winning the QSCB lottery 2009
Dummy for participation in the 2nd round allocation 2011-2012

0.187
0.346

0.391
0.477

Panel C. Economic controls
Log median household income 5-year estimate 2009
Poverty rate 5-year estimate 2009
Unemployment rate 5-year estimate 2009
Log median family income with children 5-year estimate 2009
Poverty rate for families with children 5-year estimate 2009
Unemployment rate for parents 5-year estimate 2009

11.075
13.303
8.530
11.133
14.463
5.955

0.308
7.400
3.254
0.398
9.114
3.474
(continued)

13

The webpage about the QSCB allocations was closed and became no longer publicly available since Jan. 27,
2016.

15

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Continued)
Mean
(1)

S.D.
(2)

Panel D. Demographic controls
% people with graduate degrees 5-year estimate 2009
% 4-year college graduates 5-year estimate 2009
% people with some college experience 5-year estimate 2009
% high school graduates 5-year estimate 2009
% blacks 5-year estimate 2009
% Asians 5-year estimate 2009
% other racial minorities 5-year estimate 2009
% children population 5-year estimate 2009
% aged population 5-year estimate 2009
Log median age 5-year estimate 2009

8.121
15.830
30.264
23.711
3.843
10.665
17.777
26.970
11.171
3.549

6.650
8.358
6.796
5.522
4.298
12.358
10.048
5.495
4.365
0.171

Panel E. District controls
Log number of enrolled students 2005-2009
Log current expenditure per pupil 2005-2009
Dummy for an elementary school district
Dummy for a high school district

8.560
8.693
0.341
0.136

1.436
0.145
0.475
0.343

Panel F. Housing controls
Log median number of rooms 5-year estimates 2009
Housing vacancy rate 5-year estimate 2009
% single-family homes 5-year estimate 2009
Housing ownership rate 5-year estimate 2009

1.768
9.185
89.188
63.276

0.993
9.231
8.305
11.387

A sample includes applicants for the first round allocation (Obs.=214)

allocation and allocation results in the first or second round allocations. Data on school capital
and current expenditures is obtained from the LEA Revenue and Expenditure Report SACS Data
in the California Department of Education. In this essay, school capital expenditure includes
costs of construction, renovation, the purchase of equipment, and the purchase of land; school
current expenditure for instruction includes costs of instructor’s salaries and benefits as well as
costs of class materials.
Data on district-level socioeconomic characteristics comes from the American
Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates in 2009 and 2014. The 5-year estimates are based on
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the survey for the last 5 years. For example, the ACS 5-year estimates in 2009 is based on the
survey on communities from 2005 to 2009. The 1-year estimates would be more timely but omit
a number of small districts because they are noisier.
Table 2 reports descriptive summary statistics for first round applicants. Panel A shows
statistics for outcome variables, and the rest of panels present statistics for independent variables.
The first four outcome variables are obtained by comparing between the ACS 5-year estimates in
2009 and 2014. In panel A, I do not report variables for school expenditures in 2010-2012 and
2014-2015 to save space. In the rest of panels, independent variables include a dummy for
winning the QSCB lottery, economic controls such as median household income, demographic
controls such as racial composition, district controls such as log number of enrolled students, and
housing controls such as log median number of rooms.

Results
Table 3 presents the estimation results for participation equations (4) and (5) from which
additive correction terms are created. The result shows that winning the QSCB lottery
discourages districts to participate in the second round allocation; the coefficient on dummy for
winning the QSCB lottery is 1.260 in column (2), which implies that winning the lottery
decreases the probability of participation in the second round by about 17.6% (average partial
effect). It shows that the lottery would have an unintended negative effect on school capital
investments through a decrease in participation in the second round.
Before discussing the effect of the QSCB lottery on housing market and household
sorting outcomes, we need to check whether winning the lottery increases district’s capital
investments. If QSCBs had funded school construction projects that would had been funded by
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Table 3: Participation in the QSCB Allocation; Recursive Bivariate Probit Model

VARIABLES

Participation
in 1st round
(1)

Non-participation
in 2nd round
(2)

0.166
(0.588)
0.005
(0.021)
0.009
(0.019)
0.683**
(0.302)
0.329***
(0.059)
-0.020
(0.014)
0.014**
(0.007)
-0.008
(0.009)
-0.015
(0.015)
-0.017
(0.018)

1.260***
(0.387)
0.079
(0.860)
0.538
(0.599)
0.016
(0.019)
-0.003
(0.023)
0.022
(0.397)
-0.197**
(0.088)
0.005
(0.014)
-0.007
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.010)
0.027
(0.017)
0.016
(0.017)

921

921

QSCB lottery
Participation in the 1st round
Log median household income
Poverty rate
Unemployment rate
Log current school expenditure
per pupil
Log of # enrolled students
% Blacks
% Asians
% Other races
% child population
% aged population

Observations
𝜌 = -0.633 (0.402)

Additional controls include log median income of families with children, poverty rate for families with children,
unemployment rate for parents, educational attainments, log median age, level of school districts, log median
number of rooms, housing vacancy rate, percent of single family homes, home ownership rate, and county dummies.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

other construction bonds anyway, QSCB funding could merely substitute for other bond funding.
In this case, winning the lottery could have little effect on school capital investments. With little
increase in school capital investment, the effect of the lottery on my outcome variables would
only reflect the improved financial solvency for districts. To check this issue, I estimate the
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treatment effect of winning the lottery on school expenditures by adopting the double sample
selection approach. The results are reported in Table 4.

Table 4: Effect of Winning the QSCB Lottery on School Expenditures
Fiscal year

2010
(𝑡 = 0)
(1)

2011
(𝑡 + 1)
(2)

2012
(𝑡 + 2)
(3)

2013
(𝑡 + 3)
(4)

2014
(𝑡 + 4)
(5)

2015
(𝑡 + 5)
(6)

QSCB lottery

A. 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙 + 1)
0.512
0.205
1.188
2.202*
(1.097)
(1.286)
(1.380)
(1.254)

0.149
(1.004)

-1.362
(1.108)

QSCB lottery

B. 𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ−1 (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙)
0.499
0.237
1.341
2.290*
(1.164)
(1.354)
(1.464)
(1.333)

0.846
(1.071)

-1.453
(1.178)

C. 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙)
0.002
-0.073
-0.038
-0.073
-0.066
(0.037)
(0.043)
(0.043)
(0.062)
(0.064)

-0.121
(0.087)

QSCB lottery
Observations

140

140

140

140

140

140

Each column is a separate regression. All specifications include economic controls, demographic controls, district
controls, housing market controls, county dummies, log capital expenditure per pupil 2005-2009 (panel A and B),
and log current expenditure for instruction per pupil 2005-2009 (panel C). For the detail of these covariates, please
refer to descriptive statistics in table 2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

In Table 4, outcome variables are log school capital expenditure per pupil and log
instructional expenditure per pupil. Each column is a separate regression. Since school
expenditures have right- skewed distributions (especially for capital expenditures), I transform
the outcome variable by taking the logarithm of them. One problem of this transformation is that
a few districts spend no money on school capital in certain years, so that there are zero values.
Thus, I adopt the two different approaches. First, I add one to each capital expenditure per pupil
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when taking the logarithm of it in Panel A. The second approach is that I take the inverse
hyperbolic sine function of capital expenditure per pupil in Panel B14.
The results show an interesting dynamic effect on capital expenditure in both panel A and
panel B; the effect on capital expenditure increases in magnitude until the third year (fiscal year
2013) of QSCB allocation and is suppressed after that. In the third year of QSCB allocation, the
estimated effect is 2.2 log points and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in panel A.
Panel C reports the effect on school current expenditure for instruction. Winning the QSCB
lottery appears to have a negative effect on instructional expenditure, even though estimates are
not significant. We can observe that the negative effect on instructional expenditure tends to
increase over time. This may be because the increase in school capital expenditure has a
substitution effect on instructional expenditure.
Table 5 reports the estimates for the effect of the QSCB lottery on housing market and
household sorting outcomes. I use the double sample selection model for estimation. I include all
controlled variables in panel A but impose exclusion restrictions in panel B-D. In Panel A,
column (1) shows that winning the QSCB lottery increases median housing values by 17.5
percentage points. It implies that the benefit of school capital investments exceeds the expected
increase in local taxes in the future. In the context of the Tiebout model, the effect suggests the
capitalization of school capital investments. The size of the estimated effect seems to be larger
than estimates suggested by other studies; Cellini et al. (2010) find that the passage of
construction bond referenda increases housing prices by about 6%, and Neilson and Zimmerman
(2014) find that school construction projects increase housing prices by about 10%. However,

14

The inverse hyperbolic sine function is the approximation of the log function but can take zero and negative
values. This function is sometimes used for the transformation of variables with extreme values as well as zeros and
negative values in the literature. For the further discussion about the inverse hyperbolic sine function, see
MacKinnon and Magee (1990) and Burbidge et al. (1988).
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Table 5: Effect of Winning the QSCB Lottery on Housing Market and Household Sorting
Outcomes
%𝛥 median
housing value

𝛥 housing vacancy
rate (%)

%𝛥 households
with own children

(1)

(2)

(3)

%𝛥 households
without own
children
(4)

A. Controlling for all covariates
-3.157
4.118
(2.174)
(18.282)

-1.537
(19.150)

QSCB lottery

B. Exclusion restriction 1 (log school expenditure)
17.506**
-3.159
4.098
(7.445)
(1.748)
(15.913)

-1.570
(8.985)

QSCB lottery

C. Exclusion restriction 2 (racial composition)
14.957***
-2.162
10.480
(5.522)
(1.786)
(9.665)

-5.537
(7.991)

QSCB lottery

D. Exclusion restriction 3 (log median age)
14.803**
-3.988*
5.677
(6.181)
(2.067)
(13.062)

2.391
(13.446)

QSCB lottery

Observations

17.495*
(10.366)

140

140

140

140

All specifications include economic controls, demographic controls, district controls, housing market controls, and
county dummies. For the detail of these covariates, please refer to descriptive statistics in table 2. Standard errors are
in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

considering that my estimate somewhat reflects interest savings on QSCBs as well as school
capital investment itself, it does not seem to be indefensibly large. In column (2), the estimated
effect of the lottery on the change in the housing vacancy rate is negative but not significant.
Results for household sorting outcomes show that coefficients have desired signs in column (3)(4), but they are not significant.
In estimating the double sample selection model in panel A, there is a concern that the
inclusion of the additive correction terms 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 in my regression may cause collinearity
among covariates, even though the model is formally identified. The collinearity could occur
since all covariates employed to estimate 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 are also controlled in my regression. The
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complicated nonlinearity of 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 would prevent complete collinearity, but concern still
remains. The collinearity does not bias my estimates but could make them less precise.
To check whether this potential collinearity has resulted in considerable imprecision of
my estimates, I exclude several controls from my regression by imposing exclusion restrictions
in panel B-D. These exclusion restrictions are justified if excluded controlled variables are not
correlated with an error term when conditioning on other covariates. I exclude log current school
expenditure in panel B, racial composition in panel C, and log median age in panel D. With the
exclusion of some controls in panel B-D, I find that coefficients are generally similar as in panel
A and that standard errors become smaller. Smaller standard errors mean more precise estimates.
In panel D, the estimated effect of the lottery on the change in housing vacancy rate becomes
significant at the 10% level. Unfortunately, the estimated effects on household sorting outcomes
are still not significant in panel B-D.
One may be curious about the effect of school capital investments on student’s academic
performance, expecting that the improvement of school buildings and equipment may be helpful
for student’s learning. To check this issue, I estimate the effect of winning the QSCB lottery on
student’s academic performance by using the double sample selection model. A change in
student’s academic performance can be caused by household sorting as well as the improvement
of buildings and equipment. However, we would have some implications from the results if the
effect of household sorting is limited. I measure academic performance by using the California
Assessment of Student Performance and Progress (CAASPP) test results in 201515. Dependent
variables that I investigate are log of average CAASPP score, the percentage of students who

15

CAASPP test is a standardized test in English language, arts/literacy, and mathematics for students enrolled in
public schools in California. The test began in 2014. The academic outcomes that I use in this essay are based on the
average of scores over all grades in public schools within each district.
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exceeds a specific standard, and the percentage of students who marginally meet the standard.
Table 6 reports the results. It shows that the lottery has little effect on the test results. This is the
similar results suggested by Martorell et al. (2016) and Cellini et al. (2010).

Table 6: Effect of Winning the QSCB Lottery on Student’s Performance
Log CAASPP test score
2015
(1)

% students met
2015
(3)

% students exceeded 2015

QSCB lottery

0.001
(0.016)

0.524
(5.986)

-1.619
(6.176)

Observations

139

139

139

(2)

One district is dropped from the sample due to a missing value in outcome variables. All specifications include
economic controls, demographic controls, district controls, housing market controls, and county dummies. For the
detail of these covariates, please refer to descriptive statistics in table 2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I estimate the effect of winning the QSCB lottery on school expenditures,
housing values, household sorting, and student’s academic outcomes. I find evidence that
winning the lottery increases school capital expenditure and median housing values at the district
level, but I find little evidence for the effect of the lottery on household sorting and student’s
academic outcomes. I view the estimated effect of the lottery on median housing values as the
evidence for the capitalization of school capital investments into housing values. However, we
cannot completely exclude the possibility that a change in median housing values can be driven
by the changing composition of house types within a community. This sort of bias would be
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limited if winning the lottery does not dramatically induce house construction, renovation, and
demolition for a relatively short period.
It is worth noting that it takes time to complete the construction of school facilities, so
that some of QSCB-funded construction projects might be still on the way beyond the study
period. This may be the reason why my estimates for household sorting outcomes are not
significant. There is a possibility that household sorting is actually happening but is not fully
realized for the study period because of incomplete construction. On the other hand, housing
values are likely to quickly respond to school capital investment even before the completion of
facilities. Thus, I can find the significant effect on housing values for the study period.
Unfortunately, I am not able to identify when each construction or renovation project was
complete due to the lack of data.
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Chapter II: The Effect of the Centralization of School Finance on School Revenue and
Spending: Evidence from a Reform in Michigan

Introduction
In the United States, public education has been traditionally financed by local property
taxes, which makes school spending strongly correlated with local property wealth. In
economics, this local financing system is justified by the efficiency argument for close taxbenefit linkage in the context of the Tiebout model. However, the wide disparity in school
spending between richer and poorer school districts has been a great concern in this finance
system. Since 1970s, many lawsuits and legislative actions have followed across the country,
brining significant changes to the existing school finance system in many states. Michigan school
finance reform, called Proposal A, was one of these changes in the school finance system in an
attempt to reduce school spending inequalities. It centralized school revenue sources, so that the
state can equally distribute money to each school district.
Michigan school finance reform is distinguished from most of other state-level school
finance court-rulings and legislative actions in important ways. Most court-rulings and legislative
actions have brought changes to grant formulas in favor of poorer districts, leaving local
discretion on raising revenue relatively intact. As a result, districts have still relied heavily on
local-source revenue even after the grant formula change. On the other hand, Michigan’s reform
sharply reduced local property taxes and introduced the large amount of a foundation grant that
accounts for about 60-80% of total school revenue, so that districts have become highly
dependent on state funding. Thus, Michigan’s reform can be defined as the centralization of
school finance with limited local discretion on revenue supplementation (Loeb, 2001).
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Fischel (1986 and 1996) suggests that the elimination of the Tiebout-style school finance
system (i.e. moving toward the centralization of school finance) breaks the tax-benefit linkage
for public education, converting property taxes from local education fees into taxes with a
deadweight loss. He argues that it makes the provision of public education would become less
popular among residents in rich districts, and eventually decreases mean school spending.
Fernandez and Rogerson (1999) estimate structural parameters to investigate what effect the
centralization of California school finance has on school spending under the assumption of
perfect Tiebout sorting by family income. The results suggest the reduction of school spending
by a large amount. In the similar spirit of the Tiebout model, Loeb (2001) develops a theoretical
model to examine the effect of the centralization of Michigan school finance, assuming that
households perfectly sort into communities by the demand for education inputs. The simulation
results suggest that mean per-pupil spending decreases by about $100-$700. In both Fernandez
and Rogerson (1999) and Loeb (2001), it is assumed that, under the centralized system of school
finance, the level of school spending is determined by the voter with the median demand for
education. Since the median demand is generally lower than the average demand, it is intuitive
that the centralization would lower the level of school spending.
In the literature, the empirical evidence for the effect of the centralization of school
finance on the level of school spending is limited. Silva and Sonstelie (1995) empirically
estimate price and income effects of the centralization of California school finance, finding that
it decreases mean per-pupil spending by about $1,200. Manwaring and Sheffrin (1997) find that
the centralization of California school finance reduces per-pupil spending by about $600-$800 in
the long run. Hoxby (2001) focuses on a tax price that is defined as the amount of revenue that
need to be raised for an extra dollar school spending. She finds that a higher tax price leads to
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lower school spending per pupil, implying that the elimination of local discretion on raising extra
revenue would result in a reduction in spending. Chaudhary (2009) suggests different results that
Michigan school finance reform increases log mean per-pupil spending when compared to trends
in Illinois. However, her estimates could be biased by confounded preexisting trends that will be
discussed in a later section.
There exists the related literature regarding the effect of school finance court-ruling on
school spending. Papers generally find that the court-ruling reduces the inequality in school
spending among districts (Card and Payne, 2002; Murray et al., 1998) and increase mean perpupil spending (Jackson et al., 2016; Lafortune et al., 2016; Sims, 2011a; Sims, 2011b). Some
papers study Michigan school finance reform and find that the reform leads to resource
equalization among districts (Chakrabarti and Roy, 2015; Roy, 2011; Papke, 2005), but the
question about the effect on the level of resources is not clearly answered.
This present essay suggests fresh evidence for the effect of the centralization of school
finance on the level of school revenue and spending by using Michigan school finance reform as
a policy variation. This new evidence would complement existing empirical evidence that are
mostly based on weak identification strategies. This essay uses difference-in-difference (DD)
framework that compares districts between Michigan and 4 neighboring states (Illinois, Ohio,
Indiana, and Pennsylvania), considering that neighboring states as the valid control group.
School districts are grouped together by the pre-reform level of school revenue, and the
heterogeneous effect of the Michigan’s reform is examined across groups.
My results are consistent with the prediction of the Tiebout model that the diminishing
local financing of public education would result in less school revenue and spending as the
provision of public education wins less support from residents. I find that Michigan’s reform
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reduces per-pupil revenue in both higher- and lower-revenue districts. The reform equalizes
revenue among districts by reducing revenue in higher-revenue districts faster than in lowerrevenue districts. I find that the reform also has the similar effect on current spending. I find no
evidence for the effect of the reform on school capital spending.

School Finance in Michigan
Before the reform in FY 1995, Michigan had the power equalization system. Under the
system, the local property tax base below the state minimum tax base was subsidized by the state
government16. This system intended to equalize school revenue by guaranteeing that poorer
districts had the same power to raise revenue as richer districts had. Before the reform in
Michigan, districts below 20th percentile of school revenue had funded about 60% of their
revenue on its own, and districts above the 80th percentile had funded 80 % on its own (as seen in
Figure 1). These values were substantially higher than values that four neighboring states had,
implying that the Michigan’s power equalization program had less actively intervened in school
finance so had played a smaller role in reducing resource inequalities than neighboring state’s
equalization programs had17. Michigan program’s minimum tax base was fairly low, so that not
many districts benefited from the power equalization program. In fiscal year (FY) 1994, 39
percent of districts received the positive power equalization grant (excluding a flat grant) from
the state government (Courant and Loeb, 1997)18.

16

The local property tax base is called the State Equalized Value, which was approximately one-half of market
value in Michigan.
17
Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana had partial foundation aid programs.
18
For districts that had tax bases above the minimum tax base, their flat grants were reduced by the amount in
excess of the minimum tax base times property tax rates. However, no district could receive a negative power
equalization grant (including a flat grant).
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Substantial inequalities in school spending and widespread calls for larger role of the
state government in public education were important factors leading to Michigan’s reform in
1994. The reform also was largely motivated by the heavy property tax burden. Before the
reform, Michigan’s residents had the property tax burden higher than the national average by
about 33 percent but had the sales tax burden lower than the national average by about 32
percent (Office of Revenue and Tax Analysis, 2002). There had been a strong demand for
adjusting this imbalance between property and sales taxes and the relief of property taxes in
Michigan. This resulted in referendum on school finance reform, called Proposal A, which was
passed by 69 percent to 39 percent in FY 1994. (this new program became effective in FY 1995).
The reform introduced the foundation aid program in which the state School Aid Fund
provided the minimum per-pupil school revenue (called a foundation allowance) to each school
district with some limited local discretion on raising extra revenue. The level of the foundation
allowance initially depended on district’s per-pupil revenue in FY 1994 so that higher-revenue
districts received larger foundation allowances at first. The foundation aid program gradually
reduced the initial gap in foundation allowances among districts by increasing smaller foundation
allowances faster than larger foundation allowances over time. The gradual equalization of
foundation allowances is widely reported in the existing literature (e.g. Chakrabarti and Roy,
2015; Roy, 2011).
A school operating tax on owner-occupied housing were eliminated, and the school
operating tax rate on nonhomestead properties (such as commercial buildings) was required to
drop to 18 mills if the tax rate was above 18 mills19. As a result, each district government had
less discretion on how much it raises extra local revenue so that they heavily relied on state’s

19

A cap on the property taxable value was also introduced so that the taxable value growth rate could not exceed
both 5% and the inflation rate each year.
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foundation grant for school revenue. In order to finance the state School Aid Fund, the reform
increased a state general sales tax from 4% to 6% and also newly introduced statewide property
taxes of 6 mills20.
Under the new school finance system, some rich school districts were qualified for
levying a hold-harmless tax on properties to ensure that post-reform school revenue was not
smaller than pre-reform school revenue. In practice, however, the hold-harmless tax was rarely
imposed. Thus, we can say that local-source school revenue for school operations was effectively
capped by 18 mill school operating tax on nonhomestead properties. Districts still had the full
discretion on imposing a school debt millage as well as a sinking fund millage, but revenue from
them could only be spent on school capital projects.
Table 7 presents school revenue from federal, state and local sources in pre- and postreform years. Column (3) shows that per-pupil revenue from state sources increased by about
$3,200 in first year of the reform. This increase in revenue from state sources were mostly due to
an increase in formula grants (e.g. a foundation grant, a flat grant, and a categorical grant). The
higher level of state’s grant was offset by a large drop in per-pupil revenue from local sources by
about $3,100. The drop in local-source revenue was mainly attributed to a drop in local property
taxes.
Figure 1 shows trends in the percent of revenue from local sources. The bottom (top)
revenue group is defined as districts with per-pupil revenue below the 20th (above 80th) percentile
of the per-pupil revenue distribution within each state in FY 1994. These revenue groups are
state-specific groups. We can see that the percent of local-source revenue dramatically dropped
by about 40% in both bottom- and top-revenue groups in Michigan as a result of the reform. It

20

The reform also increased an excise tax on cigarette by 50 cents per pack and newly introduced a tobacco tax of
16%. The reform reduced the state income tax by 0.2%.
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Table 7: Sources of School Revenue in Michigan
Mean of variables (Per-pupil US dollar)
Pre-reform (FY 1994)
Post-reform (FY 1995)
(1)
(2)

Differences ((2)-(1))
(3)

Federal sources

332.123
[11.835]

357.431
[12.252]

25.307
(17.035)

State sources

2,303.895
[59.220]
1,478.929
[53.552]
824.966
[21.480]

5,535.799
[50.959]
5,165.475
[45.700]
370.323
[19.702]

3,231.903
(78.127)
3,686.547
(70.401)
-454.643
(29.146)

5,429.296
[125.917]
4,787.414
[115.803]
641.882
[32.480]

2,294.871
[70.280]
1,589.379
[63.483]
705.492
[21.684]

-3,134.425
(144.202)
-3,198.035
(81.671)
63.610
(39.053)

8,065.31
[105.689]

8,188.10
[74.627]

122.79
(129.381)

Formula grants
Other state
sources
Local sources
Property taxes
Other local
sources
Sum

Values are adjusted to 2004 prices by using the CPI. Standard deviations are in brackets, and standard errors are in
parentheses.

(a)

(b)

Figure 1: Trends in the Percent of School Revenue from Local Sources
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means that Michigan’s school revenue source was substantially centralized as moving from the
power equalization program and toward the foundation aid program. On the other hand, there
had not been any discontinuous changes in neighboring state (Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, and
Pennsylvania)’s trend for our study period. This is because there had not been major changes to
the school finance system in neighboring states, supporting the use of neighboring states as the
control group for our empirical analysis.

(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 2: Trends in Per-Pupil School Revenue by Revenue Group
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Figure 2 presents trends in per-pupil revenue of the bottom- and top-revenue groups.
There seems to be no noticeable effect of the reform on per-pupil revenue in the bottom-revenue
group in Michigan, while the reform seems to have a negative effect on per-pupil revenue in the
top-revenue group. This essay wants to examine trends in Michigan school revenue and spending
when compared to the counterfactual trend in which the Michigan’s reform would had not
happened. With regard to this empirical goal, the important question is whether we can consider
trends in neighboring state’s school revenue and spending as the counterfactual trend and can
obtain unbiased estimates by comparing trends between Michigan and neighboring states. Figure
2 shows that Michigan’s per-pupil revenue grew faster than neighboring states for a pre-reform
period, so that there was likely to be difference in preexisting trends between Michigan and
neighboring states (control group). Thus, an important issue of our empirical identification would
be how to capture the different preexisting trends between Michigan and neighboring states,
which will be dealt with in a section for Empirical Strategy.

Data
Our empirical analysis is based on panel data for the period FY 1990-2004 in Michigan
and 4 neighboring states (Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania). This data set has multiple
sources. I obtain data on district-level revenues, expenditures, and the number of pupils from the
Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data of the U.S. Census Bureau for the period
FY 1992-2004. Since the Government Census does not provide the data before 1992, I add
school finance data for the period FY 1990-1991 that comes from the Common Core of Data
(CCD)21. Both the Government Census and the CCD data sets are based on common school

21

School finance data in 1990 comes from the Local Education Agency Finance Survey of the CCD, and the data in
1991 comes from the Longitudinal Fiscal-Nonfiscal data file of the CCD.
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Table 8: Description of Variables
Variable
Revenue from state sources
Revenue from local sources
School revenue
Instructional spending
Supportive services spending
Capital spending
Michigan reform, 1st year
Formula changes:
court-rulings, 1st year
Formula changes:
legislative actions, 1st year
% black students
% Hispanic students
% Asian students
% American Indian students
Unemployment rate
Log per-capita personal
income
Log # pupils

Mean [S.D.]

Description

A. Outcome variables
3,608.474 [1,698.446] Per-pupil school revenue from state sources ($)
4,172.011 [2,635.216] Per-pupil school revenue from local sources ($)
8,121.956 [2,397.768] Per-pupil total school revenue ($)
4,012.640 [1,103.318] Per-pupil instructional spending ($)
2,430.490 [819.786] Per-pupil spending for supportive services ($)
863.526 [1,593.825] Per-pupil capital spending ($)
B. Controlled variables
0.013 [0.113]
Indicator for the first year of the Michigan
school finance reform
0.014 [0.119]
Indicator for the first year of changes to state’s
grant formula caused by court-rulings
0.039 [0.194]
Indicator for the first year of changes to state’s
grant formula caused by legislative actions
5.222 [14.035]
Percent of enrolled black students
2.461 [5.878]
Percent of enrolled Hispanic students
1.156 [2.770]
Percent of enrolled Asian students
0.428 [2.645]
Percent of enrolled American Indian students
5.610 [1.287]
State-level unemployment rate lagged by 6
months
10.313 [0.092]
State-level log per-capita personal income
lagged by 6 months
7.330 [1.086]
Log number of enrolled students

The unit of observation is school districts in Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. The study period is
1990-2004. Obs.= 42,461

finance data that are submitted by each state education agency, so that there is little threat to the
consistency of our panel data between two different sources. I adjust revenues and expenditures
to 2004 prices by using the Consumer Price Index.
The Public Elementary and Secondary School Universe Survey of the CCD provides
school-level racial composition of enrolled students. I aggregate this data at the district level and
combine it with our school finance data. Lastly, I complete the construction of our panel data set
by including data on state-level unemployment rate and personal income that are obtained from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis respectively. One problem
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is that these variables for economic characteristics are reported by the academic year, while
school finance data is reported by the fiscal year. To deal with this inconsistency, I lagged
variables for unemployment rate and personal income by one year so that these economic
variables are lagged by 6-month in our panel data that varies by the fiscal year. Lagged economic
variables can be more appropriate for our analysis than contemporary variables in that the school
budget is planned in advance.
The Description of variables is presented in Table 8. Instructional spending includes
instructor salaries as well as costs of class supplies and materials. Supportive services spending
includes health and psychological services costs, administrative costs, cost of school fiscal
services, costs of operation and maintenance of plant, and student transportation costs. Capital
spending includes costs of construction, renovation, equipment purchase, and land purchase.
Instructional, supportive services, and capital spending are exclusive each other.

Empirical Strategy
While Michigan dramatically centralized school revenue sources for our study period,
neighboring states did not have not much change to their existing system as seen in Figure 1.
Considering districts in Michigan as the treatment group and districts in neighboring states as the
control group, we estimate the effect of the reform by using the difference-in-differences (DD)
event study framework. As seen in Figure 2, however, the preexisting trend in school resources is
likely different between Michigan and neighboring states, which can dispute a key assumption
for unbiased DD estimates. In our empirical model, different preexisting trends between the
treatment and control groups are captured by including state-specific time trends. We estimate
the DD event study equation as follows:
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8+
′
𝑘
′
𝑌𝑠𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡
+ 𝑋𝑠𝑑𝑡
𝛾1 + 𝑍𝑠𝑡
𝛾2 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒˗𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑠

(8)

𝑘=1

+𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟˗𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑑𝑡
𝑌𝑠𝑑𝑡 is an outcome variable (e.g. per-pupil revenue). Subscript 𝑠 indexes states, 𝑑 indexes
school districts, and 𝑡 indexes fiscal years (1990-2004). 𝑋𝑠𝑑𝑡 is the set of district-level controlled
variables such as the racial composition of students, and 𝑍𝑠𝑡 is state-level controlled variables
such as the unemployment rate. Dummies for minor changes to neighboring state’s grant
formulas are also included in 𝑍𝑠𝑡 (court-rulings and legislative actions).
𝑘
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡
is an independent variable of interest, which is an indicator for whether

Michigan’s reform becomes effective in fiscal year 𝑡. Superscript 𝑘 indicates the 𝑘th year of the
reform. Thus, 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚1𝑠𝑡 is one if the reform becomes effective in state 𝑠 in fiscal year 𝑡
𝑘
(𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚1𝑠𝑡 is zero otherwise), and 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡
is a (𝑘 − 1)-year lagged variable for 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚1𝑠𝑡 .
𝑘
By including the set of 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡
for 𝑘 = 1, … , 8, we want to estimate the dynamic effect of the

reform on school revenue and spending. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒˗𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑠 is state-fixed effects, and
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟˗𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡 is year effects. 𝛿𝑠 𝑡 is state-specific time trends that captures unobserved
confounders evolving over the time22. State-specific time trends are an essential part of this
empirical model in order to account for different preexisting trends between the treatment and
control groups.
My DD event study model is differentiated from the standard DD model (using a single
treatment dummy) in that my DD event study model estimates the dynamic response of
outcomes. My model is more suited than the standard DD method for this research since
22

It is a typical practice to account for different preexisting trends between the treatment and control groups, which
has been employed by many other studies using the difference-in-differences estimator (e.g. Wen et al., 2015;
Chaudhary, 2009).
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Michigan’s reform intended to be gradually equalizing school spending over time rather than
suddenly cutting grants to richer districts and increasing grants to poorer districts all at once.
When the magnitude of the treatment effect changes over time, state-specific time trends are
likely to capture the dynamic effect of treatment that are not captured by single treatment dummy
in the standard DD model, so that DD estimators can be biased (Wolfers, 2006). A simply
remedy for this problem is using the DD event study model and then estimating the dynamic
effect of treatment. In this essay, standard errors are bootstrapped by school district with 500
replications.

Results
Figure 3-6 present the effect of the reform on mean per-pupil school revenue and
spending by using the full sample (these estimates are also reported in Table A3 in Appendix D).
I use the DD event study model to obtain estimates in these figures. Figure 3 shows that the
reform increases per-pupil revenue from state sources by about $2,500-3,200 but decreases perpupil revenue from local sources by about $3,200-$3,900, indicating that the reform substantially
centralizes revenue sources. The decrease in per-pupil revenue from local sources is greater than
the increase in per-pupil revenue from state sources, that could lead to the drop in per-pupil
school revenue. Figure 4 shows such a drop in school revenue. The estimated effect on per-pupil
revenue has a downward trend from the beginning, but its trend stabilizes after the sixth year of
the reform. In the long run, the reform reduces per-pupil revenue by about $1,120.
Figure 5 presents what effect the reduction in school revenue has on current spending
under the reformed system. It suggests that the reduction in school revenue leads to the reduction
in school current spending. Per-pupil instructional spending appears to increase in the first three
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3: Effect of the Reform on Revenue Sources
I use the DD event study model with state-specific trends in order to estimate reform’s effect. All district- and statelevel variables are controlled in regressions.

Figure 4: Effect of the Reform on School Revenue
I use the DD event study model with state-specific trends in order to estimate reform’s effect. All district- and statelevel variables are controlled in this regression.
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year of the reform but eventually decreases in the long run. Both effects on instructional and
supportive spending have downward trends, so that the negative effects become larger over the
time. In the eighth year and onwards, my results suggest that the reform reduces per-pupil
instructional spending by about $560 and per-pupil supportive spending by about $700. The total
amount of the reduction in current spending (about $1,260) is not very different from the amount
of reduction in school revenue (about $1,120).

(a)

(b)

Figure 5: Effect of the Reform on Current Spending
I use the DD event study model with state-specific trends in order to estimate reform’s effect. All district- and statelevel variables are controlled in regressions.

Figure 6 presents the effect of the reform on per-pupil school capital spending. In
Michigan, school current spending and school capital spending are financed by different taxes at
the local level. Although the reform centralizes revenue sources for school current spending, it
does not change local taxes for capital spending. Thus, the reform may not affect school capital
spending. As expected, I find no evidence for the effect of the reform on per-pupil capital
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spending. The figure shows that the effect on per-pupil capital spending has a neither upward nor
downward trend.

Figure 6: Effect of the Reform on Capital Spending
I use the DD event study model with state-specific trends in order to estimate reform’s effect. All district- and statelevel variables are controlled in this regression.

If we use the standard DD model (using a single treatment dummy) with state-specific
time trends instead of the DD event study model with state-specific time trends, state-specific
time trends can incorrectly capture post-reform downward trends in revenue and spending in our
case. Therefore, the standard DD estimator would only capture the remaining trend after
treatment group’s trend is incorrectly adjusted upward by confounded state-specific time trends,
biasing the DD estimator toward a positive value. Using districts in Illinois as the control group,
Chaudhary (2009) estimates the standard DD model with state-specific time trends and
concludes that Michigan’s reform increases log per-pupil expenditures, but her results may not
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be free from the confounded state-specific time trends. In order to check whether the use of the
standard DD estimator significantly changes my results, I re-estimate Figure 4-6 by using the
standard DD model with state-specific time trends instead of the DD event study model and
obtain very different results (reported in Table A4 in Appendix D). The estimated effect on perpupil revenue and instructional spending are now positive (about $180 and $430 respectively)
and significant. It supports the importance of using the DD event study model when the outcome
variable has a dynamic response.
Considering that the reform intended to equalize school spending among districts by
increasing lower-revenue district’s foundation allowance faster, it would be interesting question
whether the reform achieved this goal. Therefore, this essay investigates heterogeneous effects of
the reform across revenue groups. I divide districts into five state-specific revenue groups based
on per-pupil revenue in FY 1994; the first (quantile) revenue group is districts with mean perpupil revenue below the 20th percentile of state-specific revenue distribution, the second revenue
group is districts with mean per-pupil revenue between 20th and 40th percentile of state-specific
revenue distribution, and so on. Thus, first revenue group has the lowest level of per-pupil
revenue for a pre-reform period, and fifth revenue group has the highest level of per-pupil
revenue. I estimate the DD event study model with revenue-group subsamples instead of the full
sample23. Results are presented in Table 9-12.
Table 9 reports the effect of the reform on per-pupil school revenue by revenue group.
Each column is a separate regression using a subsample. The effect on per-pupil revenue has
downwards trends in all revenue groups. The negative effects peak in sixth year of the reform

23

In Table A5 in Appendix D, I compare the mean of school revenue, spending, and control variables between
Michigan and neighboring states by revenue group. It shows that my revenue groups are reasonably comparable
between Michigan and neighboring states.
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and are a bit suppressed after that. The higher-revenue group experiences a larger drop in
revenue than the lower-revenue group, meaning that the reforms levels down per-pupil revenue
by reducing per-pupil revenue faster in higher-revenue group. For example, in the eighth year
and onwards, the reform reduces per-pupil revenue by about $560 in the bottom revenue group,
about $700 in the middle-revenue group (third revenue group), and about $1,920 in the toprevenue group.

Table 9: Effect of the Reform on Per-Pupil School Revenue by Revenue Group
Year since the
reform
1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year
5th year
6th year
7th year
8th year +

Observations
R-squared

1st revenue
group
(1)

2nd revenue
group
(2)

3rd revenue
group
(3)

4th revenue
group
(4)

5th revenue
group
(5)

31.605
(80.281)
99.166
(106.628)
-276.208**
(109.803)
-359.613***
(113.870)
-846.151***
(133.784)
-902.032***
(183.060)
-785.632***
(192.900)
-564.922**
(224.047)

107.828
(86.566)
34.387
(113.760)
-527.951***
(114.169)
-516.679***
(116.535)
-967.508***
(142.498)
-1,061.258***
(186.982)
-1,070.586***
(202.879)
-873.805***
(194.904)

284.005***
(87.644)
107.754
(104.276)
-403.249***
(122.576)
-399.712***
(126.753)
-877.347***
(161.070)
-986.536***
(203.356)
-937.703***
(198.677)
-703.127***
(203.561)

223.372*
(121.387)
-87.535
(144.500)
-625.606***
(189.941)
-711.626***
(191.598)
-1,087.465***
(227.438)
-1,175.685***
(274.455)
-1,052.898***
(291.405)
-1,067.228***
(306.547)

-379.601
(349.841)
-1,194.933***
(409.566)
-2,007.649***
(692.847)
-2,185.160***
(767.481)
-2,446.603***
(896.652)
-2,669.002***
(984.385)
-2,082.988*
(1,237.673)
-1,920.533
(1,584.415)

8,448
0.595

8,444
0.612

8,447
0.584

8,415
0.525

8,398
0.184

Each column is a separate regression using a different subsample. All regressions include state fixed effects, year
effects, district-level and state-level covariates, and state-specific time trends. 1st revenue group is school districts
with mean per-pupil revenue below 20th percentile of the state-specific revenue distribution, 2nd revenue group is
school districts with mean per-pupil revenue between 20th and 40th percentile of the state-specific revenue
distribution, and so on. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 10 presents the effect of the reform on instructional spending per-pupil by revenue
group. Except the top-revenue group, the reform appears to increase per-pupil instructional
spending in the short run, but these effects eventually disappear and become negative in the long
run. Similar to per-pupil revenue, the reform levels down instructional spending by reducing the
spending faster in the higher-revenue group. For example, in the eighth year and onwards, the
reform decreases per-pupil instructional spending by about $260 in the bottom-revenue group but
about $600 in the middle-revenue group.

Table 10: Effect of the Reform on Per-Pupil Instructional Spending by Revenue Group
Year since the
reform
1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year
5th year
6th year
7th year
8th year +

Observations
R-squared

1st revenue
group
(1)

2nd revenue
group
(2)

3rd revenue
group
(3)

4th revenue
group
(4)

5th revenue
group
(5)

278.175***
(30.798)
234.121***
(40.165)
202.332***
(42.816)
6.028
(57.005)
-112.029*
(66.333)
-115.662
(82.564)
-95.400
(90.747)
-261.928**
(102.838)

319.155***
(36.528)
253.154***
(45.082)
188.076***
(50.046)
-12.146
(57.030)
-144.844**
(69.788)
-162.455*
(85.407)
-211.426**
(88.417)
-466.079***
(90.781)

248.235***
(42.270)
179.953***
(47.666)
121.037**
(55.350)
-69.903
(61.380)
-244.273***
(77.884)
-298.890***
(95.052)
-345.356***
(101.937)
-599.019***
(103.964)

316.880***
(43.888)
219.410***
(52.994)
127.462**
(61.709)
-108.795
(72.238)
-238.639***
(90.457)
-240.521**
(115.240)
-276.014**
(125.057)
-688.677***
(131.469)

137.826
(105.426)
39.411
(146.040)
-29.556
(201.569)
-324.190
(244.796)
-479.319*
(282.820)
-589.219**
(285.092)
-443.701
(431.217)
-633.046
(569.529)

8,448
0.745

8,444
0.731

8,447
0.691

8,415
0.617

8,398
0.232

Each column is a separate regression using a different subsample. All regressions include state fixed effects, year
effects, district-level and state-level covariates, and state-specific time trends. 1st revenue group is school districts
with mean per-pupil revenue below 20th percentile of the state-specific revenue distribution, 2nd revenue group is
school districts with mean per-pupil revenue between 20th and 40th percentile of the state-specific revenue
distribution, and so on. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 11 reports the effect of the reform on per-pupil supportive services spending by
revenue group. We can see that the reform decreases per-pupil supportive services spending in
all revenue groups and equalizes the spending among groups by reducing it faster in the higherrevenue group. In the bottom-revenue group, the reform decreases per-pupil support services
spending by about $430. The higher-revenue group experiences larger drops in the spending
(about $970 for the top-revenue group). This is a similar equalization pattern that we see in the
case of revenue and instructional spending.

Table 11: Effect of the Reform on Per-Pupil Supportive Services Spending by Revenue Group
Year since the
reform
1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year
5th year
6th year
7th year
8th year +

Observations
R-squared

1st revenue
group
(1)

2nd revenue
group
(2)

3rd revenue
group
(3)

4th revenue
group
(4)

5th revenue
group
(5)

-86.913***
(30.356)
-150.817***
(38.460)
-115.176**
(45.104)
-222.418***
(49.471)
-272.820***
(59.816)
-344.222***
(69.479)
-397.596***
(77.015)
-425.220***
(80.632)

-92.305***
(31.763)
-149.717***
(35.913)
-146.573***
(45.135)
-263.798***
(47.022)
-310.226***
(54.012)
-383.542***
(65.829)
-476.727***
(69.734)
-553.468***
(74.631)

-129.096***
(34.450)
-207.692***
(39.189)
-243.736***
(45.144)
-383.980***
(49.601)
-422.551***
(58.342)
-535.459***
(77.261)
-646.492***
(80.801)
-766.223***
(85.664)

-112.760***
(41.662)
-163.392***
(49.621)
-246.580***
(55.062)
-411.666***
(62.224)
-413.289***
(74.846)
-519.046***
(89.214)
-600.014***
(98.164)
-721.532***
(100.887)

-268.692***
(89.838)
-437.810***
(114.137)
-571.002***
(151.491)
-691.679***
(180.684)
-759.189***
(195.518)
-922.667***
(229.558)
-887.290***
(276.448)
-968.203***
(339.209)

8,448
0.475

8,444
0.499

8,447
0.420

8,415
0.375

8,398
0.170

Each column is a separate regression using a different subsample. All regressions include state fixed effects, year
effects, district-level and state-level covariates, and state-specific time trends. 1st revenue group is school districts
with mean per-pupil revenue below 20th percentile of the state-specific revenue distribution, 2nd revenue group is
school districts with mean per-pupil revenue between 20th and 40th percentile of the state-specific revenue
distribution, and so on. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 12 shows the effect of the reform on per-pupil capital spending by revenue group. I
find neither downward trends nor equalization patterns among revenue groups. It seems that the
reform has negative effects on per-pupil capital spending in second revenue groups and has
positive effects in the first revenue groups. Except that, the reform hardly affects per-pupil
capital spending. There is little consistent pattern of the effect across revenue groups in the case
of per-pupil capital spending.

Table 12: Effect of the Reform on Per-Pupil Capital Spending by Revenue Group
Year since the
reform
1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year
5th year
6th year
7th year
8th year +

Observations
R-squared

1st revenue
group
(1)

2nd revenue
group
(2)

3rd revenue
group
(3)

4th revenue
group
(4)

5th revenue
group
(5)

-123.017
(155.140)
171.888
(240.794)
397.200
(278.215)
479.553
(294.671)
527.752
(350.929)
172.550
(411.556)
202.035
(472.571)
-57.550
(518.768)

-421.153**
(211.923)
-397.384
(299.368)
-331.845
(359.430)
-355.215
(400.902)
-653.780
(437.830)
-985.336*
(513.985)
-805.869
(599.935)
-831.779
(614.169)

-104.081
(173.530)
97.989
(251.508)
351.743
(298.908)
403.483
(348.692)
311.856
(385.531)
31.709
(476.900)
-126.804
(507.770)
-484.863
(508.285)

-375.955**
(185.485)
-328.311
(261.315)
20.089
(334.182)
254.620
(412.196)
136.698
(440.089)
-179.155
(546.474)
82.489
(642.243)
295.555
(806.144)

-197.216
(249.856)
-462.950
(328.625)
-388.290
(426.662)
-589.186
(484.241)
-326.651
(558.547)
326.551
(768.422)
449.539
(793.465)
144.262
(843.097)

8,448
0.080

8,444
0.067

8,447
0.071

8,415
0.056

8,398
0.041

Each column is a separate regression using a different subsample. All regressions include state fixed effects, year
effects, district-level and state-level covariates, and state-specific time trends. 1st revenue group is school districts
with mean per-pupil revenue below 20th percentile of the state-specific revenue distribution, 2nd revenue group is
school districts with mean per-pupil revenue between 20th and 40th percentile of the state-specific revenue
distribution, and so on. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Concluding Remarks
This essay estimates the effect of the centralization of Michigan school finance on the
level of school revenue and spending. I find that the centralization decreases per-pupil revenue
and current spending in all revenue groups in the long run. The per-pupil revenue and current
spending are equalized among districts as they decrease faster in higher-revenue group than in
lower-revenue groups. This can be the consequence of the elimination of the Tiebout-style
school finance system, making the provision of public education winning less support. It can be
understood in the typical framework of the underprovision of public goods as people are
reluctant to support and finance public goods that benefit herself as well as others. Thus, there
would be clear tradeoff between the level of spending and spending equality among districts.
Especially, the elimination of local discretion on raising extra revenue is expected to result in a
huge drop in the level of spending as it completely breaks the tax-benefit linkage for public
education. Thus, a reasonable compromise would be changes to state’s grant formula in favor of
poorer districts allowing the local ability to raise extra revenue. Most school finance courtrulings belong to this category in the United States.
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Chapter III: Evaluating the Fiscal Attractiveness of the Michigan School Finance Reform

Introduction
Michigan school finance reform in 1994 was one of the most dramatic school finance
reforms in the United States. The reform sharply reduced local property taxes that had financed
public education services. The following school district’s revenue loss was offset by a large state
grant which was primarily funded by 2% increase in a state general sales tax. Thus, we can say
that the reform substituted the local property tax with the state sale tax. The state government set
school district’s minimum revenue per pupil and granted it to district governments, aiming to
reduce spending inequalities among districts in Michigan.
Considering the substantial change in Michigan’s fiscal policy under the reform, a natural
research question that could be raised is how the reform’s fiscal package is valued by households
and whether it is beneficial to them. One efficient way to investigate this research question is to
use the fact that local fiscal attractiveness is capitalized into housing values. Based on the
Tiebout model, the value of reform’s fiscal package should be (de)capitalized into housing
values as households could move across districts beyond the state border to look for the best
fiscal package. Thus, by investigating how the reform affects local housing values in Michigan,
we can infer whether the reform brought an attractive fiscal package to households.
The issue of whether the reform is fiscally attractive to households is complicated for the
following four factors. First, the reform’s tax policy change (substitution of the local property tax
with the state sales tax) might affect household’s tax burden. It is generally known that the
reform reduced net tax revenue in Michigan24. However, we are not sure about how the tax

24

Office of Revenue and Tax Analysis (2002) suggests that the reduction in local property taxes was outpaced by
the increase in state taxes by $17 billion over 10 years since the reform.
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change was shifted beyond the state border. Both the local property tax and the state sales tax
could be partially passed on non-residents25. Therefore, the effect of the reform on household’s
tax burden is ambiguous. Second, the reform might change consumer surplus through the
changed level of consumption; the change in property and sales taxes might change the level of
consumption of goods and housing.
Third, the reform might reduce the level of local public education services. The reform
broke a tax-benefit link so that the level of public education services provided for households did
not depend any more on how much tax they chose to pay26. This centralization of school finance
might make the public provision of education less popular in wealthy communities, consequently
reducing the level of public education services (Loeb, 2001; Fernandez and Rogerson, 1999;
Fischel, 1996).
Fourth, the reform might have heterogeneous effects between higher- and lower-revenue
districts. There is convincing evidence that the reform equalized school revenue among districts
in Michigan (Chakrabarti and Roy, 2014; Roy, 2011). This revenue equalization would benefit
lower-revenue districts, while it would hurt higher-revenue districts. However, it is not sure
whether the reform’s tax changes were favorable to lower-revenue districts as well27. Therefore,
depending on how revenue equalization and tax changes are compared among districts, the
reform would bring a greater benefit (or smaller loss) to either higher- or lower-revenue districts.

25

For example, the increase in the state sales tax is passed on tourists and out-of-state producers. The across-state
incidence of the property tax is ambiguous. In the capital tax view, a property tax is a tax on capital and falls on the
national capital owner. In the benefit tax view, a property tax is a fee for local public services and is paid by local
residents.
26
Under the system of local financing of public education, households can choose school districts that provide the
best fiscal package for them. It makes local property taxes closely linked to the quality of education services. From a
benefit tax view, the local property tax is considered as a fee for public education services and does not cause a
deadweight loss.
27
Sales tax is known as regressive. Property tax, meanwhile, on housing is regarded as proportional, but the local
property tax structure was regressive as the tax rate is generally higher in poorer school districts (Oates and Fischel,
2016).
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In sum, the reform may bring the change in household’s tax burden, the change in
consumption of goods and housing, the lower level of school services, and heterogeneous fiscal
benefits between higher- and lower-revenue districts. This essay studies how households value
the reform’s effects by estimating the effect of the reform on housing values in Michigan. For
empirical identification, I use the difference-in-differences (DD) method that compares school
districts in Michigan with districts in neighboring states (Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) over
time. Since there was no major change in fiscal policies in neighboring states for the study
period, I consider these states as the control group of this research. To investigate the reform’s
different effect in higher- and lower- revenue districts, I divide districts into five groups within
each state according to the level of pre-reform school revenue and then estimate heterogeneous
effects of the reform among revenue groups.
My research is firmly based on the voluminous literature on the capitalization of fiscal
variables. The literature suggests clear evidence that local taxes/expenditures are capitalized (e.g.
Stadelmann and Billion, 2015; Bai et al., 2014; Rosen, 1982), educational resources are
capitalized (e.g. Brunner et al., 2002; Dee, 2000), central government grants are capitalized
(Hilber et al., 2011; Barrow and Rouse, 2004). Based on this literature, I expect that the value of
the Michigan reform’s fiscal package should be reflected by a change in housing values in the
context of the Tiebout model in which households could choose residential communities beyond
the state border. Regarding the school finance reforms of U.S. states, there is the extensive
literature on the effect of the reforms on school revenue/spending and education outcomes (e.g.
Jackson et al., 2016; Sims, 2011; Papke, 2005; Card and Payne, 2002). Nevertheless, there is
little literature studying whether these reforms are fiscally attractive to households beyond its
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effect on school resources and education outcomes. This present essay fills this gap by
investigating how the reform’s fiscal policy change is valued by households in Michigan.

Michigan School Finance Reform
The state of Michigan was one of states with the heaviest property tax burden before the
school finance reform in the fiscal year 199528. The public demand for the lower property tax
burden provoked the debate on the school financing reform and eventually ended up a state
referendum in which the reform was passed in 199429. The reform removed a local school
operating tax on homestead properties (e.g., owner-occupied housing) and required the local
school operating tax on nonhomestead properties (e.g., commercial buildings) to drop to 18
mills. The statewide property tax of 6 mills was introduced, but this new property tax revenue
could not sufficiently cancel out the revenue loss when considering that the average local school
operating tax rate was about 34 mills before the reform30. The reform was designed to offset the
revenue loss primarily by the 2% increase in a state general sales tax. The reform also increased
a cigarette excise tax by 50 cents per pack and introduced a new sales tax of 16% on tobacco
products other than cigarettes.
Figure 7 shows trends in state-local tax revenue per capita for the period of 1980-2000.
The black line indicates the trend in Michigan tax revenue, and the gray line indicates the trend
in neighboring states (Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) tax revenue. We can clearly see that
there were marked changes in the tax trend between 1990 and 2000. It seems that the reform

28

In 1993, property taxes accounted for 4.6% of personal income on average in Michigan, which was the 7th
highest share among 50 states (Office of Revenue and Tax Analysis, 2002).
29
The reform was passed through a state referendum by 69 % to 39 % in 1994. The reform became has been in
effect since the fiscal year 1995.
30
See Office of Revenue and Tax Analysis (2002), p6.
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decreased property tax revenue but increased sales tax revenue as expected. Comparing tax
revenue trends between Michigan and neighboring states, state-local property tax revenue per
capita relatively decreased in Michigan by $307.0 between 1990 and 2000. On the other hand,
state-local sales tax revenue per capita relatively increased in Michigan by $249.3 for the same
period.

(a)

(b)

Figure 7: Trends in State-Local Property and Sales Taxes per Capita
In these figures, the year refers to the fiscal year. Dollar amounts are adjusted to values in 2000. Tax values for
neighboring states are the average of state-level property/sale taxes per capita over states in the control group.

To investigate a question of whether the reform’s tax policy change was revenue-neutral,
I create the counterfactual trend in state-local total tax revenue per capita of Michigan by using
the synthetic control method (Abadie et al., 2010). I compute state-level weights given to
neighboring states, by which the weighted average outcome and predictor variables of
neighboring states are best matched with the outcome and predictor variables of Michigan for the
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pre-reform period31. Then, synthetic Michigan is created by computing the weighted average of
state-local tax revenue of neighboring states. In implementing this method, variables are indexed
to 1 in 1980. Figure 8 shows trends in state-local total tax revenue of Michigan and the synthetic
group. As clearly seen, Michigan’s tax revenue increased slower than the synthetic group
between 1990 and 2000, which can be attributed to the effect of the reform. My estimates imply
that Michigan had lower state-local tax revenue than the synthetic group by 8.2% in 2000.

Figure 8: Trends in State-Local Tax per Capita; Using the Synthetic Control Method

As explained earlier, a question of how the fiscal package of the reform are valued by
Michigan households could be answered by investigating the change in housing values. Figure 9
presents trends in the average of district-level median housing values for the period of 1980-

31

The outcome variable is state-local tax revenue per-capita. For predictor variables. I use state-level GDP per
capita and the state-level unemployment rate.
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1990. It seems that housing values in Michigan substantially outpaced housing values in
neighboring states between 1990 and 2000. I consider that the reform caused this increase in
housing values in Michigan.

Figure 9: Trends in Median Housing Values
In this figure, the year refers to the fiscal year. Dollar amounts are adjusted to values in 2000. Median housing
values for neighboring states are the average of district-level median housing values over districts in the control
group.

The reform centralized the school finance system by giving the state government extra
tax revenue as well as the authority to allocate this tax revenue to school districts. The amount of
the new state grant, called the foundation allowance, initially depended on the pre-reform
revenue level in each school district, so that school districts with higher revenue received larger
grants at first. However, the state government gradually equalized the grants among districts,
resulting in decreased school revenue inequalities over time in Michigan. How the revenue
equalization was compared to the incidence of tax changes can determine whether the reform’s
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fiscal package was favorable to higher-revenue districts. Since it is clear whether the reform
brings a greater benefit (or smaller loss) to higher- or lower- revenue districts, it is an empirical
question to be answered in this essay.

Table 13: Description of Variables
Variables

Mean (S.D.)

Median housing
values
Per-pupil local
property tax
Per-pupil school
revenue

88,814.072
(36,133.013)
2,511.555
(1,875.914)
6,250.311
(2,318.950)

Reform
Blacks
American Indians
Asians
Other races
College graduates
College experiences
HS graduates
Log # pupil
Unemployment rate
Log per-capita
personal income
Single-family homes
Townhomes
Mobile homes
Homes aged 0-5
Homes aged 5-10
Homes aged 10-20

Description
Panel A: Outcome variables
Median owner-occupied housing values ($)
Local property tax revenue per pupil ($)
School district’s revenue per pupil ($)

Panel B: Control variables
0.092 (0.289)
Indicator for Michigan reform in effect
2.871 (8.027)
Percent of black residents
0.370 (1.199)
Percent of American Indian residents
0.531 (0.874)
Percent of Asian residents
0.907 (1.633)
Percent of other races residents
14.086 (9.906)
Percent of adults (age≥25) with college degrees or above
19.752 (7.732)
Percent of adults (age≥25) with some college-level training
41.303 (7.893)
Percent of adults (age≥25) with high school degrees
7.616 (0.940)
Log number of enrolled students
5.450 (1.376)
State-level unemployment rate
10.046 (0.159)
Log state-level per-capita personal income
86.209 (9.395)
3.189 (8.135)
8.354 (6.752)
9.406 (6.093)
8.352 (5.078)
16.302 (8.041)

Percent of owner-occupied single-family homes
Percent of owner-occupied townhomes
Percent of owner-occupied mobile homes, boats, etc.
Percent of owner-occupied homes built 5 years ago or after
Percent of owner-occupied homes built 10 years ago or after
Percent of owner-occupied homes built 20 years ago or after

The sample includes school districts in Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. The study years are 1980, 1990,
and 2000. Dollar amounts are adjusted to values in 2000. Obs.=5,607

54

Data
I obtain data on district-level characteristics from the Decennial U.S. Census in 1980,
1990, and 2000. The Decennial Census provides variables for housing characteristics such as
median housing values and the age of homes and variables for population characteristics such as
racial composition and education attainments. I combine this Census data set with the Annual
Survey of Governments data (1980 and 1990) and the Public Elementary-Secondary Education
Finances data of the U.S. Census Bureau (2000) that provide government finance statistics such
as property tax revenue, sales tax revenue, and expenditure by category. The Annual Survey of
Governments was discontinued in 1992 and was replaced by the Public Elementary-Secondary
Education Finances for district-level finance statistics.
Therefore, this essay uses decennial panel data for the period of 1980-2000. The sample
includes school districts in Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. The panel data is
strongly balanced with 1,869 school districts and 5,607 observations. Michigan has 514 districts,
and neighboring states have 1,355 districts. The description of all variables is presented in Table
13.

Empirical Strategy
To estimate the effect of the reform on housing values and fiscal variables in Michigan, I
consider districts in neighboring states (Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) as the control group as
these states did not have major fiscal policy changes for the study period. Furthermore, they are
geographically closer to Michigan so that unobserved factors may not evolve very differently
between Michigan and those neighboring states over time. Nevertheless, we cannot completely
exclude the possibility of different preexisting trends in the unobserved that is correlated with the
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passage of the reform, which would bias my estimates. To deal with this issue, I control for prereform time trends by taking advantage of the panel structure of my data. In this essay, I use the
difference-in-differences (DD) method to estimate the effect of the reform as follows:
′
′
𝑌𝑠𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋𝑠𝑑𝑡
𝛾1 + 𝑍𝑠𝑡
𝛾2 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦˗𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑑

(9)
+𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟˗𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑑𝑡
Subscripts s, 𝑑, and 𝑡 indicate states, school districts, and years respectively. 𝑌𝑠𝑑𝑡 is an
outcome variable (median housing values, or local property tax per pupil, or school district’s
revenue per pupil). 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡 is a variable of interest, which is one if the reform is in effect
(year of 2000) in Michigan and zero otherwise. 𝛽 represents the treatment effect of the reform on
the outcome variable. In the above equation, both county fixed effects and year effects are
included, which are an essential part of the DD method. I also include state-specific time trends
𝛿𝑠 𝑡 in the above equation. It allows different preexisting trends in the unobserved factors, that
are correlated with 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡 , between the treatment and control groups, assuming that the
unobserved factors evolve at constant rates for the study period. The DD method with this
specification is well known and is frequently used in the literature (e.g. Chakrabarti and Roy,
2015; Wen et al., 2015; Chu, 2014). 𝑋𝑠𝑑𝑡 is district-level control variables such as racial
composition and educational attainments, and 𝑍𝑠𝑡 is state-level control variables including log
per-capita personal income and unemployment rate. I bootstrap standard errors with 1,000
replications at the district level.

Results
Table 14 reports the effect of the reform on per-pupil local property tax revenue and perpupil school revenue. Column (1) and (2) show the effect on per-pupil local property tax, and the
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specification is with and without state-specific time trends. We can see that the estimated effects
are not greatly affected by control for state-specific time trends, supporting that the difference in
preexisting trends in unobserved factors is not very significant. With controlling state-specific
time trends, my results say that the reform reduces per-pupil local property tax revenue by
$3,089.9. As discussed in the above, the decreased local property tax revenue is not likely to be
fully canceled out by an increase in other tax revenue and result in lower state-local total tax
revenue in Michigan.
The lower tax revenue should lead to the reduction in state-local expenditure in
Michigan. I expect that school district’s revenue is an expenditure category with the reduction. In
column (3) and (4), I estimate the effect of the reform on per-pupil district’s revenue. My results
show that the reform decreases the per-pupil revenue by $1257.3 in column (4) with controlling
for state-specific time trends. The estimated effects are not sensitive to whether state-specific
time trends are controlled. The negative effect on the school revenue is consistent with the
existing evidence that the centralization of school finance decreases the level of school resources
(Hoxby, 2001; Silva and Sonstelie, 1995).

Table 14: Effect of the Reform on Local Property Taxes and School Revenue
Per-pupil local property taxes ($)
(1)
(2)
Reform

State-specific time trends
Observations
R-squared

Per-pupil school revenue ($)
(3)
(4)

-2,795.879***
(131.762)

-3,089.917***
(293.719)

-1,237.495***
(164.457)

-1,257.265***
(400.642)

N
5,607
0.593

Y
5,607
0.598

N
5,607
0.651

Y
5,607
0.655

Regressions include county-fixed effects and year effects. Additional controls include racial composition,
educational attainments, log number of enrolled students, state-level unemployment rate, and state-level log percapita personal income. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 15: Effect of the Reform on Median Housing Values
(1)
Reform

Housing controls
State-specific time trends
Observations
R-squared

Median housing values ($)
(2)
(3)

(4)

15,981.426***
(852.784)

12,910.608***
(1,317.026)

16,122.079***
(793.635)

13,099.406***
(1,400.973)

N
N
5,607
0.833

N
Y
5,607
0.835

Y
N
5,607
0.871

Y
Y
5,607
0.872

Regressions include county-fixed effects and year effects. Additional controls include racial composition,
educational attainments, and log number of enrolled students. Housing controls include percent of single-family
homes, percent of townhomes, and percent of mobile homes, and variables for the age of structures. Standard errors
are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 15 presents the effect of the reform on median housing values. I include housing
controls such as housing type (e.g. percent of single-family homes) and the age of homes in
column (3) and (4) in order to block a casual channel through the change in housing quality,
while I exclude them in column (1) and (2). With controlling for housing characteristics as well
as state-specific time trends, I find that the reform increases median housing values by $13,099.4
in column (4). This effect on housing values can be interpreted as the capitalization of the
reform’s fiscal effects. The changed tax burden and consumption along with the lower level of
school services turn out to give fiscal benefits to households, and that leads to an increase in
housing values under the circumstance that households are able to move to other districts beyond
the state border to look for more attractive fiscal packages. The table shows that the estimated
effects are pretty robust to housing controls as well as state-specific time trends, so that my
results for median housing values are not significantly driven by either different time trends
among states or a change in housing quality.
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To investigate the heterogeneous effect of the reform between higher- and lower-revenue
districts, I divide school districts into five groups by the pre-reform (year of 1994) level of perpupil school district’s revenue within each state. Thus, 1st revenue group consists of school
districts with pre-reform per-pupil school revenue below 20th percentile of the revenue
distribution within each state; 5th revenue group consists of school districts with pre-reform perpupil school revenue above 80th percentile of the revenue distribution within each state. Since the
level of district’s revenue is strongly correlated with district’s property wealth, a higher revenue
group would have higher property wealth.

Table 16: Effect of the Reform on Local Property Taxes and School Revenue by Revenue Group
Samples

Per-pupil local property taxes ($)
(1)
(2)

1st revenue
group
2nd revenue
group
3rd revenue
group
4th revenue
group
5th revenue
group

-1,868.510***
(126.397)
-2,165.106***
(127.408)
-2,598.684***
(144.217)
-3,365.204***
(209.158)
-3,319.055***
(509.362)

-2,086.059***
(144.334)
-2,423.118***
(162.768)
-2,856.055***
(182.187)
-3,214.840***
(270.565)
-4,434.186***
(1,325.346)

-867.856***
(280.578)
-1,247.156***
(269.940)
-1,227.509***
(230.544)
-1,372.764***
(236.217)
-1,257.777**
(605.127)

-404.538
(359.774)
-1,038.069**
(388.163)
-1,223.621***
(356.885)
-905.467**
(362.241)
-2,215.145
(1,565.657)

N

Y

N

Y

State-specific time trends

Per-pupil school revenue ($)
(3)
(4)

A different revenue-group subsample is used in each row. Regressions include county-fixed effects and year effects.
Additional controls include racial composition, educational attainments, log number of enrolled students, state-level
unemployment rate, and state-level log per-capita personal income. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 16 reports the effect of the reform, by revenue group, on local property taxes in
column (1)-(2) and on school district’s revenue in column (3)-(4). My regression compares the
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trend in 1st revenue group in Michigan with the trend in 1st revenue group in neighboring states,
compares the trend in 2nd revenue group in Michigan with the trend in 2nd revenue group in
neighboring states, and so on. A different revenue-group subsample is used in each row. I find
that the reform reduces the property tax revenue of districts with higher pre-reform school
revenue by a larger amount. It is obvious results in that districts with higher pre-reform revenue
has greater property wealth. I also find that the reform equalizes per-pupil school revenue
through leveling-down.
It is difficult to have the complete understanding of the heterogeneous effects of the
reform between higher- and lower-revenue districts only from Table 16 since we do not know
how these estimated effects are compared in terms of household’s fiscal benefits. To fully
investigate the heterogeneous effects, I estimate the effect of the reform on median housing
values by revenue group in Table 17. The specification is with and without housing controls and
state-specific time trends. I find that the reform has greater positive effect on housing values in
districts with higher pre-reform revenue. For example, the reform increases median housing
values in the bottom revenue group by $8,706.8, in the middle revenue group by $12,327.7, and
in the top revenue group by $23,130.7. All these estimated effects are significant at 1% level.
These estimates indicate that reform brings benefits to all revenue groups but brings greater
benefits to revenue groups with higher property wealth. It may be because the tax policy changes
were favorable to wealthier households, and revenue equalization effect is exceeded by the tax
policy changes. The decrease in school revenue may not be a great disadvantage for wealthier
households since they less rely on public education. In Appendix E, Table A7 presents the
annual amount of capitalization by using four different discount factors.
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Table 17: Effect of Reform on Median Housing Values by Revenue Group
Samples
1st revenue
group
2nd revenue
group
3rd revenue
group
4th revenue
group
5th revenue
group
Housing controls
State-specific time
trends

(1)

Median housing values ($)
(2)
(3)

(4)

10,401.582***
(1,559.368)
13,027.436***
(1,534.747)
15,514.788***
(1,517.829)
17,586.281***
(1,558.784)
19,498.802***
(2,447.247)

8,277.984***
(1,913.952)
8,246.040***
(1,968.778)
11,874.060***
(2,189.764)
13,299.315***
(2,423.997)
22,048.985***
(5,006.853)

10,630.694***
(1,451.031)
13,725.652***
(1,487.604)
14,029.590***
(1,342.800)
16,790.650***
(1,534.747)
21,957.990***
(2,260.674)

8,706.847***
(1,805.154)
8,714.690***
(1,808.676)
12,327.696***
(2,067.609)
13,419.203***
(2,347.033)
23,130.744***
(4,560.265)

N
N

N
Y

Y
N

Y
Y

A different revenue-group subsample is used in each row. Regressions include county-fixed effects and year effects.
Additional controls include racial composition, educational attainments, and log number of enrolled students.
Housing controls include percent of single-family homes, percent of townhomes, and percent of mobile homes, and
variables for the age of structures. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

To answer the question of how the effect of the reform on housing values varies
according to other characteristics than the pre-reform level of school revenue, I divide districts
into five quantile groups by (a) percent of students enrolled in public school out of total
population, (b) housing vacancy rate, and (c) median household income. The results are reported
in Table 18. I find that the reform tends to increase median housing values in districts with the
lower percent of enrolled students by a larger amount. This may be because districts with fewer
enrolled students are less hurt by the reduction in school revenue, giving higher fiscal benefits to
such districts. I also find that the reform generally has a greater positive effect on median
housing values in districts with a lower housing vacancy rate. With vacant housing, upward shift
in demand for housing may reduce housing surplus instead of increasing housing values so that
districts with a higher vacancy rate may experience a smaller increase in housing values.
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Table 18: Effect of the Reform on Median Housing Values by Percent of Enrolled Students,
Housing Vacancy Rate, and Median Household Income

Samples
1st quantile group
2nd quantile group
3rd quantile group
4th quantile group
5th quantile group

Grouped by
% enrolled students
(1)

Median housing values ($)
Grouped by
Grouped by
housing vacancy rate
median household income
(2)
(3)

17,163.798***
(4,160.512)
17,824.575***
(2,707.819)
9,458.959***
(2,338.053)
12,188.519***
(2,233.932)
10,649.910***
(2,018.863)

18,332.647***
(2,949.876)
16,701.031***
(3,230.244)
6,498.980**
(2,737.991)
9,035.019***
(1,944.033)
8,580.656***
(2,725.709)

4,987.279***
(1,920.454)
4,981.469**
(1,940.727)
7,518.571***
(1,833.178)
17,817.859***
(2,579.340)
27,990.596***
(3,845.776)

A different subsample is used in each row. Regressions include county-fixed effects, year effects, and state-specific
time trends. Additional controls include racial composition, educational attainments, log number of enrolled
students, and housing controls. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I study how the reform’s fiscal policy change is valued by households in
Michigan. I find that the reform increases median housing values and that the increase is greater
in districts with higher pre-reform revenue. It can be interpreted that the reform brings a
beneficial fiscal package to households on average in Michigan and that wealthier households
receive greater fiscal benefits from the reform.

62

Appendix A: Formulas for Additive Correction Terms in Chapter I

In this appendix, I want to present the formula for additive correction terms discussed in
Chapter I. These correction terms are suggested by Poirier (1980) and Ham (1982). Every notation
∗
for variables used here is same as notations used throughout this chapter. Let define 𝑋1𝑖
= 𝑋𝑖 ,
∗
𝑋2𝑖
= (𝑄𝑠𝑐𝑏1𝑖 𝑃𝑡1𝑖 𝑋𝑖′ )′ , 𝛼1∗ = 𝛿1 , and 𝛼2∗ = (𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛿2′ )′. Then,

1

∗ ∗
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
𝜙(𝑋1𝑖
𝛼1 )𝛷 ((𝑋2𝑖
𝛼2 − 𝜌𝑋1𝑖
𝛼1 )/(1 − 𝜌2 )2 )

𝜆1𝑖 =

(A1)

∗ ∗
∗ ∗
𝐹(𝑋1𝑖
𝛼1 , 𝑋2𝑖
𝛼2 ; 𝜌)
1

∗ ∗
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
𝜙(𝑋2𝑖
𝛼2 )𝛷 ((𝑋1𝑖
𝛼1 − 𝜌𝑋2𝑖
𝛼2 )/(1 − 𝜌2 )2 )

𝜆2𝑖 =

(A2)

∗ ∗
∗ ∗
𝐹(𝑋1𝑖
𝛼1 , 𝑋2𝑖
𝛼2 ; 𝜌)
where 𝜙(. ) is the normal density function, 𝛷(. ) is the normal distribution function, and 𝐹(. ) is

the bivariate normal distribution function.
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Appendix B: Consistent Variance-Covariance Matrix in Chapter I

In this appendix, I want to explain how to compute the consistent variance-covariance
matrix under double sample selection in Chapter I. This variance-covariance matrix was suggested
by Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1980) in the case of single sample selection and was generalized by
Ham (1982) in the case of double sample selection. Every notation for variables used here is same
as notations used throughout this chapter. Let 𝜇 = (𝛿1′ 𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛿2′ 𝜌)′ be a 𝐿×1 vector of parameters
from the recursive bivariate probit model (4) and (5). Then, the difference between a true selection
correction term and an estimated selection correction term is approximated by the first-order
Taylor series with respect to 𝜇 such that
𝜕𝜆1𝑖 ′
(𝜇 − 𝜇̂ )
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝜆2𝑖 ′
̂𝑖 =
(𝜇 − 𝜇̂ )
𝜆2𝑖 − 𝜆2
𝜕𝜇

(A3)

̂𝑖 =
𝜆1𝑖 − 𝜆1

Let define 𝐶𝑖 = 𝜎𝜐1

𝜕𝜆1𝑖 ′
𝜕𝜇

+ 𝜎𝜐2

𝜕𝜆2𝑖 ′
𝜕𝜇

(A4)

. Then, 𝐶 = (𝐶1 𝐶2 … 𝐶𝑁−1 𝐶𝑁 )′ is a 𝑁×𝐿 matrix. Let 𝑋 ∗ =

̂ 𝜆2
̂ ) be a 𝑁×𝐾 matrix of variables, and let 𝛽 ∗ = (𝛾 𝛽 ′ 𝜎𝜐1 𝜎𝜐2 )′ be a 𝐾×1 matrix of
(𝑄𝑠𝑐𝑏1 𝑋 𝜆1
coefficients. Then,

̂∗
𝛽∗ − 𝛽

′

−1

(A5)

′

(𝑋 ∗ 𝑋 ∗ ) 𝑋 ∗ (𝜀 + 𝐶(𝜇 − 𝜇̂ ))

where 𝜀 is a vector of error terms from housing market outcome equation (5). In estimating the
variance-covariance matrix, we can ignore covariance between 𝜀 and 𝐶(𝜇 − 𝜇̂ ) . Then, the
variance-covariance matrix is
−1

̂∗ ) = (𝑋 ∗′ 𝑋 ∗ ) 𝑋 ∗′ (𝜀𝜀 ′ + 𝐶(𝜇 − 𝜇̂ )(𝜇 − 𝜇̂ )′ 𝐶 ′ )𝑋 ∗ (𝑋 ∗′ 𝑋 ∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽
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−1

(A6)

In this chapter, I compute the following variance-covariance matrix.
̂
̂∗ )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽
∗′

∗

(A7)
−1

= (𝑋 𝑋 ) 𝑋

∗′

(𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑒𝑖2 )

∗′

̂ ))𝐶 )𝑋 (𝑋 𝑋 )
+ 𝐶(𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜇̂
′

∗

∗

−1

̂ ) is the estimated
where 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(. ) is a diagonal matrix, 𝑒𝑖 is an estimated error term, and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜇̂
variance-covariance matrix of 𝜇̂ .
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Appendix C: Additional Tables for Chapter I

Table A1: Effect of Winning the QSCB Lottery on Housing Market and Household Sorting
Outcomes; Basic OLS Regression with Single Sample Selection
%𝛥 median
housing value

𝛥 housing vacancy
%𝛥 households
rate (%)
with own children

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

%𝛥 households
without own
children
(4)

QSCB lottery

3.642**
(1.499)
1.088
(1.326)

-0.013
(0.501)
-0.194
(0.432)

1.433
(3.189)
1.397
(2.604)

1.427
(2.204)
1.277
(2.257)

214
0.748

214
0.591

214
0.472

214
0.418

Participation in
the 2nd round
Observations
R-squared

All specifications include economic controls, demographic controls, district controls, housing market controls, and
county dummies. For the detail of these covariates, please refer to descriptive statistics in table 2. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A2: Effect of Winning the QSCB Lottery on Housing Market and Household Sorting
Outcomes; not Controlling for Correction Terms with Double Sample Selection
%𝛥 median
housing value

𝛥 housing vacancy %𝛥 households
rate (%)
with own children

VARIABLES

(1)

(4)

(2)

%𝛥 households
without own
children
(3)

QSCB lottery

5.708**
(2.332)

-0.244
(0.700)

-0.464
(4.868)

1.252
(3.354)

Observations
R-squared

140
0.759

140
0.712

140
0.549

140
0.515

All specifications include economic controls, demographic controls, district controls, housing market controls, and
county dummies. For the detail of these covariates, please refer to descriptive statistics in table 2. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix D: Additional Tables for Chapter II

Table A3: Effect of the Reform on Revenue and Spending; Full Sample
Per-pupil
school revenue
Year since the
reform
st

1 year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year
5th year
6th year
7th year
8th year +

Observations
R-squared

Per-pupil
supportive spending

Per-pupil
capital spending

(1)

Per-pupil
instructional
spending
(2)

(3)

(4)

29.642
(76.741)
-223.536**
(98.558)
-799.048***
(152.054)
-871.472***
(164.929)
-1,282.723***
(193.710)
-1,403.552***
(215.767)
-1,244.588***
(260.310)
-1,121.788***
(317.867)

250.961***
(30.109)
179.047***
(34.234)
108.108**
(43.182)
-116.724**
(51.180)
-257.191***
(59.695)
-297.181***
(66.338)
-291.330***
(87.818)
-560.621***
(110.619)

-143.827***
(22.987)
-223.347***
(29.249)
-271.331***
(37.095)
-401.622***
(42.670)
-440.560***
(48.662)
-546.661***
(56.868)
-610.394***
(65.906)
-707.352***
(78.110)

-252.810***
(86.235)
-195.270
(125.509)
9.073
(156.383)
46.580
(178.461)
3.761
(197.602)
-134.214
(241.056)
-60.784
(278.640)
-216.971
(305.617)

42,461
0.331

42,461
0.402

42,461
0.256

42,461
0.049

Each column is a separate regression using a different subsample. All regressions include state fixed effects, year
effects, district-level and state-level covariates, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A4: Effect of the Reform on School Revenue and Spending; Standard DD Method with
State-Specific Time Trends
Per-pupil
school revenue

Michigan’s reform
Formula changes:
court-rulings
Formula changes:
legislative actions
% black students
% Hispanic students
% Asian students
% American Indian
students
Unemployment
rate
Log per-capita personal
income*1,000
Log # pupils

Observations
R-squared

Per-pupil
supportive
spending
(3)

Per-pupil
capital spending

(1)

Per-pupil
instructional
spending
(2)

183.451**
(75.496)
337.520***
(58.497)
497.939***
(31.063)
28.484***
(2.477)
9.877
(6.464)
272.811***
(27.182)
35.752***
(13.803)
-349.599***
(25.705)
-12.582***
(1.206)
-232.271***
(76.445)

426.101***
(34.326)
-97.021***
(17.210)
133.271***
(11.974)
12.062***
(1.152)
5.738**
(2.750)
120.945***
(10.874)
19.500**
(7.602)
-45.825***
(11.571)
-2.004***
(0.377)
-76.036*
(39.391)

-15.546
(21.740)
-62.649***
(12.076)
50.692***
(9.466)
13.263***
(0.973)
0.921
(2.332)
93.255***
(10.302)
9.946**
(4.321)
-60.990***
(6.693)
-0.299
(0.253)
-57.628**
(23.369)

-9.972
(92.038)
-78.823
(74.922)
254.234***
(43.300)
-3.656***
(0.738)
-0.751
(1.654)
38.328***
(5.946)
9.312
(5.894)
-173.485***
(29.597)
-4.925***
(1.529)
32.427**
(16.137)

42,461
0.329

42,461
0.401

42,461
0.255

42,461
0.048

(4)

All regressions include state fixed effects, year effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A5: Mean of School Revenue, Spending, Racial Groups, and the Number of Pupils for the
Pre-Reform Period
1st revenue 2nd revenue
group
group
(1)
(2)

3rd revenue
group
(3)

4th revenue
group
(4)

5th revenue
group
(5)

Full sample
(6)

Michigan
Neighboring states

5,769.250
5,680.391

A. Mean of per-pupil school revenue
6,267.285 6,701.845 7,572.193
6,100.287 6,459.931 7,160.968

10,110.669
9,812.949

7,280.982
7,042.356

Michigan
Neighboring states

5,178.654
4,967.229

B. Mean of per-pupil current spending
5,592.196 5,931.695 6,583.116
5,290.085 5,575.065 6,115.197

8,323.280
8,213.819

6,316.234
6,032.535

Michigan
Neighboring states

465.361
353.583

C. Mean of per-pupil capital spending
489.879
593.169
643.499
441.889
454.068
578.185

912.578
885.501

615.472
541.725

Michigan
Neighboring states

1.148
1.213

D. Mean of % black students
1.095
1.357
7.140
2.134
3.446
7.161

9.640
9.057

4.279
4.587

Michigan
Neighboring states

2.067
0.770

E. Mean of % hispanic students
1.920
2.174
2.400
1.243
1.904
2.358

2.302
2.792

2.186
1.808

Michigan
Neighboring states

0.392
0.354

F. Mean of % Asian students
0.503
0.570
0.923
0.507
0.678
1.023

1.581
3.026

0.785
1.120

Michigan
Neighboring states

1.129
0.069

2.074
0.109

1.672
0.081

Michigan
Neighboring states

1,503.657
1,710.191

4,203.722
4,622.718

2,921.112
2,701.753

G. Mean of % American indian students
1.114
1.569
1.867
0.070
0.079
0.077
H. Mean of # pupils
1,832.454 2,207.031 5,022.660
1,783.799 2,096.067 3,333.645
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Appendix E: Additional Tables for Chapter III

Table A6: Effect of the Reform by Revenue Group; Using Log of Outcome Variables
Log Per-pupil local
property taxes
(1)
(2)

Samples

Log Per-pupil school
revenue
(3)
(4)

Log Median housing values
(5)

(6)

Full sample

-1.364***
(0.040)

-1.180***
(0.042)

-0.206***
(0.019)

-0.154***
(0.027)

0.159***
(0.007)

0.176***
(0.014)

1st revenue
group
2nd revenue
group
3rd revenue
group
4th revenue
group
5th revenue
group

-1.294***
(0.082)
-1.446***
(0.082)
-1.374***
(0.085)
-1.404***
(0.086)
-0.906***
(0.092)

-1.183***
(0.090)
-1.284***
(0.079)
-1.311***
(0.087)
-1.143***
(0.093)
-0.909***
(0.106)

-0.164***
(0.041)
-0.193***
(0.040)
-0.207***
(0.036)
-0.228***
(0.038)
-0.202***
(0.054)

-0.072
(0.052)
-0.138**
(0.050)
-0.189***
(0.049)
-0.145***
(0.048)
-0.197**
(0.082)

0.141***
(0.015)
0.155***
(0.012)
0.142***
(0.014)
0.157***
(0.015)
0.191***
(0.016)

0.171***
(0.022)
0.147***
(0.020)
0.142***
(0.023)
0.156***
(0.027)
0.227***
(0.043)

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

State-specific
time trends

A different sample is used in each row. Regressions include county-fixed effects, year effects, and state-specific
time trends. Additional controls include racial composition, educational attainments, log number of enrolled
students, and housing controls. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A7: Annual Amount of Capitalization ($) by Discount Rate
Sample

𝑟 = 0.04
(1)

𝑟 = 0.05
(2)

𝑟 = 0.06
(3)

𝑟 = 0.07
(4)

Full sample

523.976

654.970

785.964

916.958

1st revenue group
2nd revenue group
3rd revenue group
4th revenue group
5th revenue group

348.274
348.588
493.108
536.768
925.230

435.342
435.735
616.385
670.960
1,156.537

522.411
522.881
739.661
805.152
1,387.845

609.479
610.028
862.939
939.344
1,619.152

For the calculation of the annual amount of capitalization, I use estimates for capitalization in column (4) of Table
15 and 17. 𝑟 refers to discount rates. Let A be an estimated effect on housing valaues, and r be a discount rate. Using
the standard method, the annual amount of capitalization is Ar.
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